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Four Ways of Looking at a Lawsuit: How Lawyers 
Can Use the Cognitive Frameworks of Mediation 
Jonathan M. Hyman  
ABSTRACT 
Lawyers who represent their clients in mediation may often find 
themselves at odds with their mediators. The mediators may be trying 
to create new value for the parties, beyond a simple compromise of 
their legalistic claims and defenses. They may be seeking to repair or 
improve the parties’ relationship, or they may wish to lead the parties 
to greater mutual understanding. Lawyers, on the other hand, are 
more likely to engage in adversarial, legalistic bargaining, looking 
only to gain the most, or to give up the least, through a process of 
compromise. As a result, the mediators’ approaches clash with those 
of the lawyers. The tensions are more deeply rooted than a simple 
difference in goals, tactics, or techniques; they arise from the 
different cognitive frameworks about the nature of conflict and the 
ways to deal with it that mediators and lawyers bring to their 
meeting. These cognitive frameworks, often operating tacitly and 
without an actor’s conscious awareness, create different and 
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competing perceptions among mediators and lawyers about what is 
relevant for the process and what is appropriate for them to do. The 
mediation literature has articulated four different, if overlapping, 
cognitive frameworks for dealing with conflict in a mediation setting: 
distributive compromise, creating more value for all, changing 
relationships, and increasing the mutual understanding of the parties 
in conflict. Mediators may move through all four, though they might 
tend to identify themselves with one in particular. Lawyers, however, 
tend to be limited to the first: distributive compromise.  
Understanding the cognitive frameworks shows how lawyers can 
operate congruently with mediators, rather than in opposition to 
them. The cognitive frameworks are versions of ways that people—
lawyers included—ordinarily have available to deal with conflict. 
There is nothing inherent in “legal thinking” that prevents lawyers 
from shifting into non-adversarial frameworks in mediation. 
However, it is not easy to shift from one cognitive framework to 
another simply by wishing to do so. The different frameworks are 
characterized by different topics of conversation. Whether one talks 
about what happened in the past, what will happen in the future, the 
legal or moral meaning of the event, the parties’ feelings or their 
relationship, or how they intend to move into the future, the topic will 
suggest which particular cognitive framework is in use, and may 
influence the other participants to engage in the same framework.  
INTRODUCTION 
The growth of mediation has significantly challenged the lawyer‘s 
craft of representing clients. What should a lawyer think and do while 
appearing with a client at a mediation session? The actions 
appropriate for a trial or similar adjudicatory hearing may be largely 
out of place before a mediator. In mediation, satisfaction of the 
client‘s goals can only come about through voluntary agreement by 
the parties to the dispute, not through persuasion of a neutral 
decision-maker of the rightness of one‘s cause.1 Nor will the actions 
 
 1. Persuading the mediator of the rightness of the client‘s cause can be part of satisfying 
the client‘s goals, but only in an indirect manner. Despite her formal impartiality, a mediator 
who can see the correctness or virtue of the client‘s claims may engage in a variety of actions 
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most appropriate for bilateral negotiation always serve the interests of 
the client. The presence of the mediator changes the dynamics of the 
negotiation process. His or her participation can neutralize the moves 
that might be most effective in simple bilateral negotiation. However, 
mediation is an opportunity as well as an obstacle. It gives the lawyer 
options that are unavailable in adjudication and rare in negotiation. 
Lawyers need to know how to seize these opportunities. 
The mediation field is just beginning to articulate what lawyers 
should think and do while representing clients in mediation. We have 
lists of dos and don‘ts, and a wide collection of war stories and 
suggestions.
2
 Some scholars have developed systematic approaches 
to the problem, primarily focusing on using mediation to overcome 
various strategic, cognitive, and emotional barriers to negotiated 
agreement.
3
 Others urge lawyers to use mediation to develop 
enhanced settlement proposals that would serve the interests of the 
parties better than simple compromises of bargaining positions.
4 
 
that could influence the other party to come around to what the client wants. For instance, the 
mediator might subtly or not so subtly indicate her views on the legal merits of the client‘s 
claims, thereby inducing the other party to make some concessions in his bargaining positions. 
The mediator might indicate her views regarding the unfairness with which the other party 
treated the client, or the fairness of the settlement terms proposed by the client. Even without an 
explicit opinion, such views might be subtly conveyed through tone of voice, facial expressions, 
body language, and control of the agenda of discussion. As useful as such persuasion might be 
to the client, the lawyer‘s persuasion of the neutral mediator is still only one step in the process 
of persuading the other party to do what the client wants, not an end in itself. 
 2. For a recent and wide-ranging collection of advice to lawyers about mediation, see 
generally HANDBOOK ON MEDIATION (Thomas E. Carbonneau, Jeanette A. Jaeggi & Sandra K. 
Partridge eds., 2006), including, among others, articles such as Joel E. Davidson, Successful 
Mediation: The Dos and Don’ts, in HANDBOOK ON MEDIATION, supra, at 71; Karin S. Hobbs, 
Attention Attorneys! How to Achieve the Best Results in Mediation, in HANDBOOK ON 
MEDIATION, supra, at 177. 
 3. See Jean R. Sternlight, Lawyers’ Representation of Clients in Mediation: Using 
Economics and Psychology to Structure Advocacy in a Nonadversarial Setting, 14 OHIO ST. J. 
ON DISP. RESOL. 269, 297–331 (1999) (reviewing recent cognitive science about negotiation 
and decision-making for insight into how lawyers representing clients in mediation can be more 
effective). 
 4. Harold Abramson, Problem-Solving Advocacy in Mediations: A Model of Client 
Representation, 10 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 103, 112–32 (2005); HAROLD I. ABRAMSON, 
MEDIATION REPRESENTATION: ADVOCATING IN A PROBLEM-SOLVING PROCESS 13–65 (2004) 
(setting out the goals and methods a lawyer representing a client can use in mediation to capture 
opportunities for value-creating resolutions). For an approach to advocacy in mediation that is 
comprehensive and insightful, but perhaps somewhat less systematically conceptual, see 
generally JOHN W. COOLEY, MEDIATION ADVOCACY (1996). ―[T]he role of the mediator 
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These are sound developments, but the field has not yet reached the 
stage of conceptual maturity. Trial practice has received a much more 
thorough treatment, effectively putting together both general concepts 
and advice about specific actions.
5
 Negotiation by lawyers, drawing 
on extensive and continuing research in economics and psychology, 
has also received extensive treatment that is both conceptual and 
pragmatic, and quite different from our models of trial practice.
6
 
Representation of clients in mediation draws on both persuasive legal 
advocacy and artful negotiation, and yet does not fit well with either. 
It seems to be terrain in which the techniques of trial practice and the 
techniques of negotiation collide, producing a kind of conceptual fog. 
It would be desirable to burn the fog away. This Article is a 
preliminary attempt to do so. The task is made more challenging by 
the fact that good mediation theory is not unitary; it does not set out a 
single description of effectiveness. Instead, it encompasses a seeming 
patchwork of distinctive approaches, sometimes overlapping and 
sometimes conflicting. Good legal representation requires the 
flexibility to deal with such a variety of mediators and approaches to 
mediation.  
The varieties of mediation are neither random nor infinitely 
variable, however. The broad variation among mediation styles 
masks an underlying structure that arises from four qualitatively 
distinct ways in which we understand and deal with conflict. While 
they might be spelled out explicitly, I suggest that, for the most part, 
these four different concepts operate tacitly, without our conscious 
awareness or control. We might call them ―cognitive frameworks‖ or 
―mental maps.‖ They automatically give the parties, mediators, and 
lawyers a coherent sense of what words and actions are appropriate. 
They might also be termed ―rhetorical tropes,‖ different formulations 
 
involves instinctive reactions, intuition, keen interpersonal skills, and sensitivity to subtle 
psychological and behavioral indicators,‖ as well as logic and rationality. Id. at 4. 
 5. See ROBERT P. BURNS, A THEORY OF THE TRIAL 4–5 (1999); THOMAS A. MAUET, 
TRIAL TECHNIQUES (4th ed. 1996); ALBERT J. MOORE ET AL., TRIAL ADVOCACY: INFERENCES, 
ARGUMENTS AND TECHNIQUES (1996).  
 6. See ROBERT H. MNOOKIN ET AL, BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO CREATE 
VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES (2004); G. RICHARD SHELL, BARGAINING FOR ADVANTAGE: 
NEGOTIATION STRATEGIES FOR REASONABLE PEOPLE (2d ed. 2006); THE NEGOTIATOR‘S 
FIELDBOOK (Andrea Kupfer Schneider & Christopher Honeyman eds., 2006). 
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of how people see the world and understand the appropriateness of 
certain actions. Conflicts arise between lawyers and mediators when 
they mediate using different cognitive frameworks. 
Understanding that modes of mediation arise from different and 
potentially conflicting frameworks raises important questions for 
lawyers. Can lawyers move from framework to framework, or are 
they limited to a ―lawyerly‖ framework that will remain in conflict 
with those that some mediators use? Beyond avoiding or managing 
conflict between lawyers and mediators, lawyers may benefit their 
clients by taking advantage of the various available frameworks. 
Precisely because mediation can provide such a rich variety of 
alternative frameworks for dealing with conflicts and disputes, it 
offers benefits to clients and to our system of disputing, beyond those 
that adversarial adjudication or even distributive, positional 
bargaining can provide. 
I will discuss the frameworks in more detail in Part I. By way of 
introduction, I will briefly summarize them here and then illustrate 
them with some stories from mediations. In the first of the four, the 
participants use mediation as an opportunity for the parties to 
negotiate in a distributive, positional manner. I will call this a 
―Distributive‖ framework. It is by far the most familiar framework. It 
is also the most ―lawyerly‖ one, the one in which most lawyers are 
inclined to work and the one that most lawyers would recognize. The 
second type of framework is not merely distributive. It uses 
mediation to uncover the parties‘ underlying real world interests and 
needs, and uses those interests to craft agreements that will provide 
more tangible benefits to the parties than simple distributive 
negotiation. This is a ―Value-creating‖ framework. The third type, a 
―Relationship‖ framework, treats the prime purpose of mediation 
quite differently; in this framework, mediation is an opportunity to 
repair or improve the parties‘ relationship. I will call the fourth 
category ―Understanding.‖ It uses mediation as an opportunity for the 
parties in conflict to increase their understanding of themselves and 
of those who are enmeshed in conflict with them. The parties use 
their increased understanding to decide what to do about their 
conflict. Whether they reach a specific agreement that resolves their 
dispute is less important than increasing their mutual understanding 
of it. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 34:11 
 
 
In Part II, I describe the concept of frameworks in more detail. I 
show how the conflict between the lawyers and the mediators 
depicted in the examples arises from the fact that they are using 
different frameworks. They are probably not ―seeing‖ things in the 
way the others in the room do. Part II also compares these four 
frameworks with different conceptual taxonomies of conflict 
management that have been proposed and described by others. 
Urging lawyers to inhabit these alternative frameworks raises the 
question of whether lawyers can think in the alternative frameworks 
in the first place. Their legal training and experience, their sense of 
role, and the logical and distributive nature of much legal work
7
 may 
make it mentally difficult, if not impossible, to embrace any of the 
alternative frameworks. In Part III.A, I discuss why legal reasoning 
and lawyers‘ mental habits should not disable them from adopting 
one or more of the alternative frameworks. 
In Part III.B, I discuss how lawyers can bring the alternative 
frameworks into the mediation room for themselves. Because 
frameworks are a form of tacit knowledge, operating often without 
conscious awareness or control, it may be difficult for lawyers to 
intentionally or knowingly put them on or take them off like a suit of 
clothes. I suggest a more accessible way for lawyers to enter different 
frameworks. The guideposts are the subject matters discussed during 
the mediation. Certain subject matters are more distinctly part of 
some frameworks than others. By observing the kinds of subject 
matters discussed in a mediation, a lawyer can key into which 
frameworks the other participants may be using. By bringing up 
certain critical subject matters herself, or by continuing to discuss 
those subject matters in more depth and breadth as a mediation 
progresses, a lawyer can influence the others to maintain or change 
their thinking, and either continue or shift the cognitive framework. I 
identify seven key topics of discussion. They are:  
 
 7. Legal reasoning and distributive, positional negotiation have analogous logical 
structures. Both involve categories with dividing lines between them. See Leonard L. Riskin, 
Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 29, 44 (1982) (providing a description of lawyers‘ 
―philosophical map‖); see also infra notes 78–79 and accompanying text. 
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1. What happened and what it meant;  
2. What can or will happen in the future;  
3. Law and legal rights;  
4. Fairness and moral rights;  
5. Relationship;  
6. Feeling; and  
7. What someone wants, what they can get, and how they can 
get it.  
No subject matter belongs exclusively to one of the frameworks. 
Some can appear prominently in several, and the particular content 
that is discussed within a subject matter may vary in different 
frameworks. They are a suggestive diagnostic tool for identifying a 
framework in operation, not a definitive one. Similarly, if a lawyer or 
mediator were to move the discussion into one of these subject areas, 
or to continue talking in a subject area when the others seem ready to 
change the subject, it will not guarantee that the mediation or its 
participants will adhere to the particular framework associated with 
the subject matter. However, the subject areas do provide a 
reasonably accessible way for lawyers to try to guide the mediation 
and the other participants into a desired framework. 
I. FOUR SCENES FROM A MEDIATION 
To describe the ways in which lawyers can operate at cross 
purposes with mediators and mediation, I will set out four different 
mediation incidents, inspired by a recent book describing a variety of 
mediations.
8
 Each incident highlights a different model or framework 
of mediation, and each produces a different kind of conflict with a 
lawyer. 
 
 8. See generally JEFFREY KRIVIS, IMPROVISATIONAL NEGOTIATION: A MEDIATOR‘S 
STORIES OF CONFLICT ABOUT LOVE, MONEY, ANGER—AND THE STRATEGIES THAT RESOLVED 
THEM (2006). I have used disputes and some of the negotiation dynamics described by Krivis, 
but I have imagined actions by lawyers in the mediation that Krivis does not describe. Krivis 
focuses on what mediators have done in the various situations he describes; I add the accounts 
of lawyers to change the focus to what lawyers can and should do in mediation. 
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Incident 1—The Automobile Accident 
 This dispute arose from an automobile accident that 
occurred when the defendant‘s car, turning left at an 
intersection, collided with the plaintiff‘s oncoming car. The 
plaintiff alleged that the defendant had negligently made the 
left turn without looking. The defendant alleged that the 
plaintiff had been speeding. The plaintiff suffered several 
broken ribs and some bruises and sprains and experienced 
some residual stiffness. He demanded $1 million in damages. 
The defendant‘s lawyer, however, offered only $3,000 to settle 
the personal injury claims, giving as reasons the following 
facts: under comparative negligence, the plaintiff was probably 
more than 50 percent responsible because of his speeding and 
thus entitled to nothing; the plaintiff‘s medical insurance had 
paid for the plaintiff‘s medical expenses; and the plaintiff‘s 
personal injury lawyer was known to make extreme demands 
in settlement negotiations, only to settle on the eve of trial after 
making huge concessions. 
 The mediator sought to deal with the huge gap by meeting 
with each side separately (commonly called caucusing) and 
expressing her opinion to each that their settlement positions 
were way out of line, were not supported by the facts, and did 
not reasonably reflect the likely outcome at trial. In her view, 
the extreme settlement positions were taken only as a hardball 
negotiating tactic of dubious effectiveness. Despite the 
mediator‘s interventions, the lawyers refused to change their 
settlement positions.
9
 
Did the lawyers do the right thing? In this instance, they were 
negotiating with highly positional strategies within a distributive 
framework. The framework was distributive in that the lawyers were 
 
 9. See KRIVIS, supra note 8, at 147–55. In Krivis‘s story from which this account is 
adapted, the plaintiff‘s lawyer initially refused to disclose medical information showing that the 
defendant was legally blind. The defense lawyer was not yet aware of the information, and the 
plaintiff‘s lawyer wanted to save it for surprise at trial. The mediator persuaded the plaintiff‘s 
lawyer to disclose the information to the defense lawyer, thus substantially increasing the 
defendant‘s settlement offer. KRIVIS, supra note 8, at 154. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol34/iss1/3
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2010]  Four Ways of Looking at a Lawsuit 19 
 
 
negotiating about a single issue: the dollar amount of the settlement 
payment to the plaintiff. That issue required a constant sum 
distribution: each dollar more to the plaintiff was an equivalent dollar 
less to the defendant‘s insurance company. The lawyers‘ strategies 
were positional in that their work consisted primarily of taking 
negotiation positions—$1 million and $3,000, respectively—with the 
aim of inducing large concessions from the other side while 
conceding as little as possible themselves. The lawyers seemed to 
embrace deadlines as a tactical negotiating tool; they expected that 
the other side would refrain from making the largest concession in 
their position until trial was upon them.
10 
The mediator was also operating in a distributive framework. She 
was treating the size of the settlement payment as the only issue to be 
negotiated, and she accepted that the settlement funds were to be 
distributed in accordance with the negotiating positions taken by the 
lawyers. Within that framework, she was trying to speed up the 
process of making mutual concessions to get to an agreed settlement 
number well before the eve of trial and wean the lawyers from their 
highly competitive positional tactics. The conflict between the 
mediator and the lawyers was about how to play the tactics of the 
positional, distributive game. 
Incident 2—The Real Estate Purchase 
 A religious school negotiated to purchase a building. There 
was some written communication between the school and the 
building owner, but before a formal real estate sales contract 
was signed, the owner signed a sales contract for a higher price 
 
 10. See LEIGH L. THOMPSON, THE MIND AND HEART OF THE NEGOTIATOR 34–35 (3d ed. 
2005) (describing research showing that the rate of negotiation concessions increases as 
negotiators near their final deadlines, and that negotiators believe deadlines are a strategic 
weakness); see also William Zartman, Timing and Ripeness, in THE NEGOTIATOR‘S 
FIELDBOOK, supra note 6, at 143, 143–44. 
 The lawyers in this example may well have been using the mediation primarily as a device 
to obtain information from the other side, a kind of free discovery, rather than as a strategic step 
towards immediate settlement. If so, they had little interest in reaching an agreement at the 
mediation itself. However, they were probably still operating in a distributive framework, using 
mediation to gather information so that they might seize the largest possible share (or give up 
the smallest possible share) when the matter is settled, as it probably will be, later and closer to 
trial. 
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with a commercial real estate buyer. The school‘s lawyer 
claimed that the school had a binding agreement to purchase 
the property. The owner‘s lawyer alleged that any 
communication between the school and the owner, whether 
oral or written, was no more than preliminary negotiation and 
was not legally binding. 
 At a mediation of the dispute attended by the school, the 
building owner, and the third party buyers, the mediator sought 
to find out what plans the third party buyer had for the 
property. The buyer‘s lawyer said that the plans were ―private 
information‖ and told the buyer not to discuss them.11 
Did the buyer‘s lawyer act effectively? Like the lawyers in the 
first incident, the buyer‘s lawyer here was apparently operating in a 
distributive, positional framework. Within that framework, disclosure 
can be risky, and might be used by the other party for tactical 
advantage. Information about the buyer‘s plans might suggest that the 
buyer‘s expressed settlement position was a bluff, for instance, and 
could undermine the buyer‘s negotiating credibility. The disclosure 
of information might also give the school some extra bargaining 
leverage in ways not clearly foreseen. 
Unlike the first incident, however, the mediator here was not 
simply trying to speed up the exchange of concessions. Instead, the 
mediator can be understood to have been operating in an entirely 
different framework: value-creating
12
 or interest-based negotiation. 
This framework conceives of negotiation and mediation as 
opportunities to expand the pie, not just to distribute it.
13
 The 
 
 11. See KRIVIS, supra note 8, at 114–23. In the case that inspired this example, the school 
was a religious one and the mediator wore a kippah, even though he was not an observant Jew, 
so that he might elicit trust from the school‘s director. That effort seemed to work. The conflict 
was resolved by completing the sale of the property to the new buyer, who then leased the 
property to the school. Id. I have added the objection from the buyer‘s lawyer, which does not 
appear in Krivis‘s account. Such an objection is consistent with a distributive, positional 
approach to negotiation, rather than one based on the parties‘ underlying needs. In a positional, 
distributive approach, it is important to conceal information that could damage one‘s 
negotiating position.  
 12. DAVID A. LAX & JAMES K. SEBENIUS, THE MANAGER AS NEGOTIATOR: BARGAINING 
FOR COOPERATION AND COMPETITIVE GAIN 88–116 (1986). 
 13. Id. at 89. 
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mediator was looking for greater substantive efficiency, trying to find 
or invent exchanges that would make at least one party better off than 
they would have been with no agreement, while at the same time not 
diminishing the agreement‘s value to the others. The key is to 
identify interests of the parties that are complementary and not 
entirely in conflict. By understanding their underlying needs and 
interests, the parties can ―invent options for mutual gain.‖14 The 
mediator in this instance asked about future plans to see if, in some 
way, the plans of the new owner might be satisfied without requiring 
the school to give up its needs.
15
 
Incident 3—The Car Wash Loan 
 The plaintiff and the defendant had known each other for 
several years, attending the same church and seeing each other 
at their children‘s athletic events. The plaintiff loaned the 
defendant $30,000 to purchase and operate a car wash. When 
the defendant failed to repay as provided in the loan 
agreement, the plaintiff brought suit. 
 At the mediation, the mediator began to ask about how the 
plaintiff and defendant came to know each other and what kind 
of contact they had apart from the loan. The plaintiff‘s lawyer 
intervened, stating that the questions were irrelevant to the case 
at hand. She asserted that the plaintiff had a strong case, that 
she—the lawyer—was hired to collect the debt, and that the 
 
 14. ROGER FISHER ET AL., GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENTS WITHOUT 
GIVING IN 56 (2d ed. 1991). 
 15. In the case from which this example is drawn, the new owner did not immediately 
need the building for another use. He was thus in a position to take title and then rent the 
property to the school. The new owner‘s delayed need could have been used by the school to 
drive a harder positional bargain; the new owner‘s demand for immediate possession could be 
seen as a bluff, giving the school less need to compromise any dollar settlement demand. But 
the complementary nature of the needs—the school wanted to use the property immediately, 
and the new owner only needed it later—opened the door to an agreement that capitalized on 
the difference. The interests of both parties were satisfied without having to decide or 
compromise on the issue of who was legally entitled to the property, or how many dollars 
would be required to get the school to drop its lawsuit. See KRIVIS, supra note 8, at 114–22. 
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mediator was just trying to get the plaintiff to make an 
unnecessary concession for the sake of ―friendship.‖16 
Here, again, the lawyer was operating in a positional, distributive 
mode, looking to maximize the amount of the financial settlement. 
She expressed her concern that, out of friendship, her client would 
make a concession that was not required either by the legal strength 
of the case or by the negotiation dynamics. Was she acting 
appropriately for a mediation? 
This mediator was operating in yet a different framework. Rather 
than attempting to speed up the positional negotiation dance or trying 
to create value by working with underlying needs and interests, the 
mediator was exploring the relationship between the parties. She 
could have been asking herself how it happened that two people with 
both a social and a business relationship ended up in a situation in 
which they could not resolve the issue of debt payment. Was there 
something about the way they related or communicated that caused or 
perpetuated the conflict? Looking forward, the parties would 
probably continue to have some kind of relationship, even if their 
business arrangements were terminated. Would that relationship be a 
satisfactory one, or would acrimony from their dispute unnecessarily 
poison it? Could the mediation be an opportunity for clarifying and 
improving the relationship between the disputants? 
Incident 4—The Promotion 
 A fifty-two-year-old employee failed to get a promotion 
and a raise. She claimed that she was denied the promotion 
because of her age and because she had complained about 
certain company practices that she thought were immoral and 
possibly illegal. She also claimed that because of her age, her 
supervisor had failed to assign her work that would 
demonstrate her competence. 
 
 16. See KRIVIS, supra note 8, at 92–113. In Krivis‘s story, the plaintiff‘s lawyer objected 
to talking about relationships, but shrugged, gave in, and fell silent when the mediator interested 
the creditor in preserving his friendship with the debtor. The mediator moved to a Relationship 
framework by closing the lawyer out of the conversation, rather than having the lawyer 
participate. Id. 
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 The company‘s lawyer and the head of its human resources 
department appeared at the mediation. The employee‘s 
supervisor did not. The mediator had asked the company to 
have the supervisor attend, but the company‘s lawyer refused, 
saying that this meeting was not going to be a group therapy 
session or an opportunity for the employee to get free 
discovery.
17
 
The lawyer was operating in the familiar distributive, positional 
mode. Was this good lawyering? Information is a key element in 
positional negotiating. Each side seeks to obtain as much information 
about the other as it can, while concealing information that would 
undermine the credibility of its commitment to a negotiating position 
or give the other side additional negotiating leverage. If the 
supervisor had spoken in the mediation, she might have revealed 
information about herself or about what happened that might have 
shown the employee‘s legal case to be stronger than the employee‘s 
lawyer might otherwise have assumed. With a more optimistic view 
of the outcome of the case, the employee would have been less likely 
to settle for the small amount that the defendant would prefer. The 
mediation was not critical for the disclosure of information; if the 
matter had proceeded to pretrial discovery, the employee would have 
been able to take the supervisor‘s deposition and get some of the 
same information.
18
 However, depositions cost the employee money, 
and she could use any money saved to pay for other pretrial 
preparation or to avoid the demoralizing effect of incurring large 
expenses along the laborious road to trial. 
The mediator, however, was using a fourth framework. Rather 
than focusing on information about the possible outcome of a trial, 
 
 17. See id. at 7–18. In Krivis‘s account of the mediation, the defendant, rather than the 
lawyer, objected to having the plaintiff talk about why the discharge had been so difficult for 
him, fearing that such discussion would make the proceeding a therapy session rather than a 
settlement. The defense lawyer was willing to hear the plaintiff, however, and the matter 
ultimately settled. Id. 
 18. The mediation might produce more information than a deposition because a 
deposition is limited to what is legally relevant. The matters discussed in the mediation are 
limited only by the will of the participants and the mediator. On the other hand, the mediation 
might also produce less information, since a witness is required to answer relevant, non-
privileged questions in a deposition, but can refuse to speak in a mediation. 
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which would be used for positional jockeying, the mediator sought to 
learn how the participants understood what happened, how they 
understood the other parties to the conflict, and how they understood 
themselves. In what ways did the employee and the supervisor 
misunderstand the other? What did each expect from the other and 
from themselves that created the conflict in the first place? What 
were they expecting now that was preventing them from managing 
the conflict without litigation? By increasing understanding, the 
mediator aimed to help the parties develop their own more effective 
ways of dealing with others, themselves, and conflict situations. 
Although the conflict was most likely linked to a web of situational 
factors and the expectations of others, it initially arose between the 
employee and the supervisor. Dealing with the conflict in this fourth 
framework cannot be done without the direct participation of the 
people present at its inception. 
The foregoing scenes pit mediators and lawyers against each 
other. In each scenario, the lawyer operated in a way that thwarted 
the methods used by the mediator. In the midst of a process designed 
to manage conflict and resolve disputes, mediators and lawyers found 
themselves engaged in a conflict about the process itself. Is this 
conflict inevitable? Is there something about the way that lawyers 
think and make decisions that inevitably keeps them in the positional, 
distributive mode? The conflict presents a normative question as 
well. Should lawyers and mediators work in conjunction with each 
other, rather than at cross purposes? And if so, how can a lawyer do 
it? 
In my view, the conflict is neither necessary nor desirable. 
Lawyers representing clients in mediation can and should be able to 
work with the same focus and goals as mediators. They should work 
congruently, but not because conflict makes people uncomfortable or 
should be avoided. In fact, as many mediators know, conflict is not 
necessarily bad; it can be used to build better situations and 
encourage better outcomes. One could argue that the tension between 
lawyers and mediators is a good thing. Rubbing a lawyer‘s 
adversarial mode against a mediator‘s more collaborative one might 
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produce something that is better than cooperation.
19
 However, I think 
that it would be better for lawyers and mediators to work 
congruently. Mediation has benefits for people in conflict that are 
substantially different from and beyond what legal adjudication and 
the adversary process can provide. Lawyers who cut themselves and 
their clients off from those benefits by adhering only to the 
distributive, positional ways of settling disputes leave our dispute 
resolution system a poorer place.
20
 
To explore how lawyers can work congruently with mediators 
rather than in conflict with them, we need to understand more fully 
the nature of the conflicts exemplified by the incidents. In my view, 
the conflicts do not arise simply from personal or stylistic differences 
between specific mediators and lawyers. They do not result from 
mediators and lawyers each trying to seize personal control of the 
situation. Instead, they exemplify more fundamental mental 
frameworks or schemas of conflict.
21
 The incidents can arise from 
basic differences between the ways the lawyers and the mediators 
understand conflict and what to do about it. For lawyers and 
mediators to work in concert, each needs to share the mental 
frameworks and schemas of the other. 
 
 19. BERNARD S. MAYER, BEYOND NEUTRALITY: CONFRONTING THE CRISIS IN CONFLICT 
RESOLUTION 248–79 (2004) (arguing that there is a place for adversarial lawyers in a good 
conflict management process, although it seems to require that lawyers direct their efforts 
somewhere other than the mediation room itself). 
 20. See generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A Philosophical 
and Democratic Defense of Settlement (In Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663 (1995). 
 21. For a sobering description of how assumptions about litigation and mediation get in 
the way of satisfying client needs in medical malpractice litigation, see Tamara Relis, 
Consequences of Power, 12 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 445, 446–48 (2007) [hereinafter Relis, 
Consequences of Power] (arguing that pervasive and mistaken assumptions about litigation and 
related actions prevent parties from obtaining the benefits that they want and that mediation 
might be able to provide). One might see my arguments here as trying to articulate a path 
between litigation assumptions and those of mediation. The task is made particularly complex 
because, in my view, there is not one model of mediation, but several. See also TAMARA RELIS, 
PERCEPTIONS IN LITIGATION AND MEDIATION: LAWYERS, DEFENDANTS, PLAINTIFFS, AND 
GENDERED PARTIES 8–12 (2009) [hereinafter RELIS, PERCEPTIONS IN LITIGATION AND 
MEDIATION]. 
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II. THE MENTAL FRAMEWORKS OF MEDIATION 
Mediation theory has exploded with a mind-boggling diversity of 
concepts and views. Is mediation bargaining or therapy?
22
 Do 
mediators only handle the narrow issues that the parties present to 
them, or do they address the broader range of issues, needs, and 
interests that drove the parties into the dispute?
23
 Is the goal of 
mediation to bring the disputing parties to agreement, or just to 
enable them to understand the other party better and become more 
effective in handling their concerns themselves?
24
 
I think this welter of voices can be best understood in terms of 
four distinct mental models or cognitive frameworks of mediation:  
1. Distributive negotiation through positional methods;  
2. Value-creating negotiation through interest-based methods;  
3. Relationship; and  
4. Understanding, which encompasses a variety of methods or 
approaches that focus on increasing the parties‘ understanding 
of themselves, the others in the conflict, and the situation. For 
lack of a single term in the literature, I will call this fourth 
category Understanding, although it is not limited to the 
 
 22. See, e.g., Susan S. Silbey & Sally E. Merry, Mediator Settlement Strategies, 8 L. & 
POL‘Y 7, 19–20 (1986). 
 23. See, e.g., Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding Mediators’ Orientations, Strategies, and 
Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed, 1 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 7, 17–18 (1996) [hereinafter 
Riskin, Understanding Mediators’ Orientations] (noting that a mediator‘s interventions can be 
understood as choices between more facilitative or more evaluative interventions, and between 
a broader or narrower definition of the problem to be addressed); Leonard L. Riskin, 
Decisionmaking in Mediation: The New Old Grid and the New New Grid System, 79 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1, 11–26 (2003) [hereinafter Riskin, Decisionmaking in Mediation] (suggesting a 
move away from the facilitative-evaluative spectrum in describing a mediator‘s intervention 
and replacing it with a spectrum that instead runs from directive to elicitative, with the ―new, 
new grid‖ retaining the broad to narrow scale in describing a mediator‘s choices for how to 
understand and address the dispute or conflict). 
 24. See, e.g., ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF 
MEDIATION: THE TRANSFORMATIVE APPROACH TO CONFLICT 53–59 (rev. ed. 2005). Bush and 
Folger describe the most important goal of mediation and mediators to be transformative rather 
than problem-solving. Under this approach, the mediator does not seek a resolution of the 
dispute, but instead focuses on increasing each party‘s ―empowerment‖ to solve their problems 
more effectively on their own, and improving each party‘s ―recognition‖ of the other party‘s 
situation, concerns, and perceptions. Id. 
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specific, so-named ―Understanding‖ method developed by 
Gary Friedman and Jack Himmelstein.
25
 
Each of these models is exemplified by the mediator‘s work in 
one of the incidents described above. In each incident, the conflict 
arose from the fact that the lawyer was operating in a Distributive 
framework with a highly positional method, while the mediator was 
operating in a different framework (as in the latter three incidents) or 
in the same framework but at a different pace (as in the first incident). 
The question for lawyers in mediation is whether, in their role as 
lawyers for clients, they can inhabit any or all of the various 
frameworks that mediators use, or whether they are limited to the 
Distributive framework and the competitive style that each lawyer 
exemplified in the incidents. 
By mental frameworks, I mean something different from 
techniques or methods or even goals. The characteristics of the four 
frameworks—dividing the pie through distributive gamesmanship, 
enlarging the pie with new options, considering and trying to improve 
the relationship between the parties, or giving the parties greater 
perspective about each other—are familiar to mediators and students 
of mediation. But are these simply different techniques used by 
mediators in a haphazard fashion according to personal preference, 
self-conscious goals, or a habitual response? Do mediators pick them 
for instrumental reasons, such as focusing on relationships to soften a 
party‘s resistance to concessions in their negotiating position? Are 
the techniques best understood as arrayed across one or two 
continuous scales, with a mediator picking and choosing along the 
scale as seems appropriate?
26
 
As I use the term, mental frameworks are more distinct than 
haphazard techniques ranged on a continuum. I treat each as a 
relatively coherent mental system. Each elicits from the person 
 
 25. GARY FRIEDMAN & JACK HIMMELSTEIN, CHALLENGING CONFLICT: MEDIATION 
THROUGH UNDERSTANDING, at xxv–xxxv (2008). 
 26. Leonard Riskin‘s grids—whether old, new old, or new new—conceptualize mediator 
choices of action as sliding along several continuous scales, with no obvious breaking points. 
His model of a 2 X 2 matrix along two scales tells us about differences in quantity, but does not 
help us decide whether mediators‘ actions differ in quality, or when differences in quality 
occur. See Riskin, Decisionmaking in Mediation, supra note 23, passim. 
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operating within it—mediator, lawyer, or disputant—a particular set 
of questions, statements, and interactions that make sense.
27
 
Sometimes, the framework will be apparent to an actor who can then 
make a conscious decision to say or do something appropriate for the 
framework she intends to use. Someone using a Relationship 
framework, for instance, may say to herself that she needs to know 
more about the parties‘ relationship, and will consciously decide to 
seek relevant information. Much more often, however, the mental 
framework operates in a tacit, unarticulated way. Information about 
relationships will just seem more pertinent to an actor whose thinking 
is structured by the Relationship framework. The actor will want to 
seek out more information about relationships even without making a 
conscious decision to do so, and will perhaps not be even fully aware 
of what she wants to know or why. The Transformative approach 
fostered by Robert Baruch Bush and Joseph Folger,
28
 a part of what I 
call the Understanding framework, is challenging to many mediators 
and lawyers precisely because it engages a different framework of 
thinking—one that is both explicit and tacit—than the Distributive 
framework that many mediators and most lawyers inhabit. The 
Understanding framework, as exemplified by the Transformative 
model, is qualitatively different from the Distributive, Value-creating, 
and Relationship frameworks.
29
 Whether they consciously articulate 
it or not, it is obvious to transformative mediators that the terms of 
possible resolution are of minimal importance. At most, the terms 
become relevant late in the process, and arise from the parties‘ own 
decision to use their greater empowerment and recognition to 
structure a specific plan for what to do. For people operating in a 
 
 27. This kind of mental structure is sometimes called a ―schema‖ or ―script.‖ For a study 
of mediator-like ombudspersons that uses the concept ―Working Mental Model‖ to describe the 
schematic mental blueprints that practitioners use, see Kenneth Kressel & Howard Gadlin, 
Mediating Among Scientists: A Mental Model of Expert Practice, 2 NEGOT. & CONFLICT 
MGMT. RES. 308, 311–12 (2009). 
 28. See BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 24, at 45–59. 
 29. Id. at 45. ―[W]e do not believe that [the different approaches to mediation] can be 
combined or integrated, at either the theoretical or practical levels. In effect, each of these 
theories represents a coherent viewpoint that guides one‘s view of both the meaning of conflict 
and the value of intervention.‖ Id. The ―coherent viewpoint‖ does more than guide the 
mediator‘s view of meaning and the value of intervention. It also guides, often tacitly, a 
mediator‘s specific actions and statements in the mediation itself. 
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Distributive mental framework, however, it is equally obvious that 
one needs to pay attention to possible terms of resolution from the 
very beginning of the process. 
The four mental frameworks, as I describe them, are not 
watertight buckets, each excluding the contents of the other. Many 
specific statements or actions can appropriately appear in several of 
the frameworks, although they may not be used for the same 
purposes. For instance, as just noted, a mediator thinking in a 
Distributive framework may focus on the relationship of the parties 
because it might be useful to encourage them to modify their 
settlement positions and elicit more distributive concessions. 
However, a mediator thinking in a Relationship framework would 
focus on the parties‘ relationship for intrinsic reasons, not just 
because the focus is useful for other purposes. For such a mediator, 
the flaws in the parties‘ relationship and communication would be 
seen as the key issue.  
The Distributive framework is well understood. One might even 
call it the default framework, the model of conflict and conflict 
resolution that first comes to mind when people think about the topic. 
It fits well with disputed legal claims, since legal claims primarily 
focus on whether one of the parties is entitled to take something from 
the other. The Value-creating framework is also well developed, both 
in the field of legal negotiation
30
 and, more recently, in guidance for 
lawyers representing clients in mediation.
31
  
The Relationship framework may be more difficult to see as a 
separate cognitive entity.
32
 By Relationship, I mean something more 
 
 30. For examples from the substantial literature available on this subject, see LAX & 
SEBENIUS, supra note 12, at 88–116; FISHER ET AL., supra note 14, at 56–57; MNOOKIN ET AL., 
supra note 6, at 173–82; SHELL, supra note 6, at 76–80. 
 31. See ABRAMSON, supra note 4, at 30–46; Sternlight, supra note 3, at 348–65. 
 32. To examine the role of repairing or improving relationships in actual mediations, 
Dwight Golann surveyed participants about relationship issues in their mediations. He found 
that relationship repair was articulated as one goal, but it was usually not achieved in practice. It 
became secondary to other issues and dynamics in the mediation. See Dwight Golann, Is Legal 
Mediation a Process of Repair—or Separation? An Empirical Study, and Its Implications, 7 
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 301, 304–31 (2002). I suspect that relationship issues were shunted 
aside because the participants were operating in either a Distributive or a Value-creating 
framework and the relationship issues simply could not keep their place in the talk and 
decision-making that occurred. This remains a suspicion, since Golann‘s account does not, and 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
30 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 34:11 
 
 
than whether the parties are friendly, cordial, or hostile to each other, 
or whether they have some formal bond, such as belonging to the 
same family or same organization. More generally, the concept 
encompasses issues of how people engage and communicate with 
each other, as well as what expectations they may have about how 
each should relate to the other. It can be an aspect of the latent causes 
of conflicts when parties‘ hostility and dysfunction arises from 
aspects of their communication and relationship that they do not 
perceive or understand. Relationship issues may be more difficult to 
understand as a separate cognitive framework because the parties‘ 
relationship can appear in Distributive, Value-creating and 
Understanding frameworks as well. A mediator working in a 
Distributive framework, for instance, may be concerned with how the 
parties are relating in the mediation itself; if they are more 
comfortable with each other or are communicating better, they should 
be better able to make the kind of reciprocal concessions required to 
find a mutually agreeable settlement position. Similarly, if the parties 
in a Value-creating framework are seeking to construct an ongoing 
arrangement that will benefit both, the quality and effectiveness of 
their future relationship will have an important bearing on the success 
of their agreement. In each of these, the relationship issues are 
understood as secondary to the dynamics of the primary framework, 
but are still considered instrumental to make the work in the primary 
framework more effective. The Relationship framework, by contrast, 
gives primacy to understanding and dealing with the parties‘ 
relationship. For example, a mediator who seeks to identify and 
resolve a latent conflict between the disputants is most likely working 
in a Relationship framework. The task of such a mediator is to reveal 
the latent conflict and resolve it,
33
 not help the parties reach a 
 
could not, provide the kind of detail about the mediations that would be necessary to examine 
this issue.  
 33. Psychologist Kenneth Kressel has described as ―strategic‖ a style of mediation in 
which the mediator posits that the apparent conflict arises from a latent one, and makes it her 
task to bring the latent conflict to the surface and change the expectations the parties have of 
each other and the way they communicate. Kenneth Kressel, The Strategic Style in Mediation, 
24 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 251, 252 (2007) (―[T]he focus of the mediator‘s attention and activity 
[in the strategic style] is on ascertaining whether there is an underlying or latent cause that has 
fueled the parties‘ conflict.‖); id. at 257 (―The mediator‘s intervention [in a child custody 
dispute] hinged on surfacing a maladaptive communication pattern between the father and his 
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compromise position on distributing assets, or find new, mutually 
beneficial terms of agreement, or enhance mutual understanding. 
Some might feel that I have improperly split a single varied 
mental concept of mediation into four distinct frameworks. Others 
may protest that I have improperly lumped together mediation styles 
that should be kept quite distinct.
34
 This is particularly true for the 
fourth category; Understanding. Not only does that category include 
the Understanding model of Gary Friedman and Jack Himmelstein
35
 
and the Transformative model of Robert Baruch Bush and Joseph 
Folger,
36
 it also includes such approaches as Narrative Mediation
37
 
and Insight Mediation.
38
 Each of these models has features, goals, 
and operating assumptions that are different from the others.
39
 
However, for our purposes, they share a key conceptual feature that 
distinguishes them from the Distributive, Value-creating, and 
Relationship frameworks: an emphasis on improved reciprocal 
understanding between the parties. They treat this goal as an intrinsic 
one, not as an instrumental step to some other goal such as reaching 
an agreement. They view the parties‘ perception of the conflict as 
 
children.‖). Kressel does not categorize this style as drawing on a relationship framework, but I 
believe it appropriately fits within the Relationship framework I am describing here, which 
gives special attention to problems in the relationship, whether those problems are patent and 
known to the participants or latent and only suspected by the mediator. 
 34. The tension resulting from splitting apart things that should be kept together, or 
lumping together things that should be kept apart, hovers over any effort to classify. A modern 
example is bird taxonomy, which is undergoing substantial change; taxonomists are now 
splitting some bird species into several new species (enabling birders to add to the size of their 
life lists) and lumping together as one species groups of birds that had formerly been known as 
separate. See JONATHAN WEINER, THE BEAK OF THE FINCH 41 (1995) (―Taxonomists can be 
classified into splitters and lumpers.‖); Bird Taxonomy, WILDBIRDS.COM, http://www.wild 
birds.com/dnn/IdentifyBirds/BirdTaxonomy/tabid/109/Default.aspx (last visited Dec. 1, 2010). 
 35. See FRIEDMAN & HIMMELSTEIN, supra note 25, at xxv–xxxv. 
 36. See BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 24, at 45–59. 
 37. JOHN WINSLADE & GERALD MONK, NARRATIVE MEDIATION: A NEW APPROACH TO 
CONFLICT RESOLUTION passim (2000) (describing conflict as growing out of the differing and 
competing stories, or narratives, that each party uses to explain to themselves and to others what 
has happened, and further describing the mediation of conflict as helping the parties develop a 
new narrative or story about themselves and the situation that will enable them to do something 
appropriate and effective about the conflict and move on). 
 38. Cheryl A. Picard & Kenneth R. Melchin, Insight Mediation: A Learning-Centered 
Mediation Model, 23 NEGOT. J. 35, 37–41 (2007) (describing a method in which one seeks to 
learn more about how the conflict threatens what is important to each party, thereby permitting 
a shift in attitudes and creating space for creative action). 
 39. Id. at 37. 
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malleable; through the mediation, the parties may come to understand 
their conflict in a different way, a way that comes from their own 
insight rather than from the insights of the mediator. These 
approaches also minimize the mediator‘s direct role in solving the 
dispute and maximize the opportunity and responsibility of the 
parties to develop their own resolution.
40
 A Distributive mediator 
might unilaterally develop a compromise position and influence the 
parties to accept it. A Value-creating mediator might unilaterally see 
options for mutual gain that the parties have not yet recognized and 
use the mediation as an occasion to tell it to the parties. A 
Relationship mediator may understand the parties‘ latent conflict and 
show them what they need to do to resolve it. However, the mediators 
of the Understanding framework let the parties develop their own 
ideas for how to move to a better future, including deciding whether 
to resolve the dispute or not.
41
 The Understanding framework does 
have some important similarities to the Relationship framework. 
Those engaging in the Understanding approach see the conflict as 
arising in part from features of the parties‘ relationship, and the 
conflict itself contributes to distorted or partial communication. The 
problems with the relationship are not the key feature of the 
Understanding framework, however; for this framework, improving 
understanding will enable the parties to improve or reshape their 
relationship as they decide. 
Beyond Reason, a recent book by Roger Fisher and Daniel 
Shapiro about handling emotions in negotiation, provides a vivid 
example of the difference between the Distributive, Value-creating 
and Understanding frameworks.
42
 It recounts the story of Fisher‘s 
advice to the buyer of a radio station who was stymied by the refusal 
of one of the co-owners to sell. Fisher asked the buyer what he knew 
about the recalcitrant co-owner. From the small amount of 
 
 40. Id. at 38–39. 
 41. See BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 24, at 53 (―[P]arties who come to mediators are 
looking for—and valuing—more than an efficient way to reach agreements on specific 
issues.‖); WINSLADE & MONK, supra note 37, at 90 (At the end of the mediation process, 
―many people are in a stronger position to negotiate the details about settling the dispute 
themselves.‖). 
 42. ROGER FISHER & DANIEL SHAPIRO, BEYOND REASON: USING EMOTIONS AS YOU 
NEGOTIATE (2005). 
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information available—nobody had asked the co-owner—Fisher 
inferred that the co-owner had roots in the community, had a growing 
family, and wanted to continue his work. Fisher advised the buyer to 
offer the co-owner a position with the station after the sale, together 
with an enhanced sale price, because he needed to have the co-owner 
take a smaller share of the business. The co-owner accepted, and the 
deal went through. The buyer was pleased, and gleefully told Fisher 
that the seller ―fell for‖ the negotiation move.43 The buyer understood 
the deal as a distributive, positional one; he ―won‖ by making the 
more clever positional move to induce the seller to agree. Fisher, 
however, understood the deal as a Value-creating one. Using 
underlying interests, he constructed terms—specifically, continued 
work at the station—that were high gain to the seller but low cost to 
the buyer and thus created more overall value than any single cash 
amount would have done. For someone in an Understanding 
framework, however, even this arrangement would not have been 
satisfactory. It would have ―failed‖ because the buyer never ―got‖ it. 
He never understood how the situation looked from the perspective of 
the seller. He never understood enough about the seller or enough 
about how his own bargaining style and viewpoint had kept him from 
being able to construct the appropriate sale terms. From an 
Understanding framework, the fact that the sale was successfully 
accomplished would be secondary to the increased understanding that 
permitted the parties to arrive there themselves.  
A. The Origins and Implementation of Cognitive Frameworks 
As with any theory that describes action through cognitive 
frameworks, this one must explain something about how a framework 
arises and how it persists. I assume that three different influences 
play a role. First, some of the framework is attributable to the 
automatic responses the actor has to conflict. These responses are 
those that the actor has from being a social creature in the world, 
interacting—and sometimes conflicting—with others. Second, some 
of the framework of automatic responses arises from the actor‘s 
professional expertise, a set of cognitive understandings and 
 
 43. Id. at 126. 
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appropriate actions that the actor has learned by experience in the 
role. These are so well learned that they happen automatically, 
without the actor‘s conscious thought or choice.44 The third important 
influence is conscious thought, an actor‘s explicit identification of 
possible choices of action and a self-aware choice of one path or 
another. 
Readers may disagree as to how important each of these 
influences may be. I tend to think that the third, conscious choice, 
plays a relatively small role in the day-to-day behavior of 
professionals dealing with conflict. The psychologist Jonathan Haidt, 
for instance, likens the interplay between conscious and automatic 
reactions and decisions to someone riding an elephant. The rider—
consciousness and intentionality—thinks he or she is in control, but 
in fact most of the action and reaction comes from the elephant.
45
 A 
reader may disagree and think one‘s relationship with the 
unconscious is more like walking an obedient dog than riding an 
unruly elephant. In my view, most of what a mediator or a lawyer 
says and does in mediation is a combination of automatic reactions 
drawn from everyday, non-professional life and the automatic 
professional expertise that the mediator or lawyer has learned with 
experience.
46
 The frameworks that come with professional expertise 
are layered on top of or next to the ―civilian‖ ones, sometimes 
displacing them, sometimes amplifying them, and sometimes 
conflicting with them. Conscious awareness can become prominent 
when one is learning a new profession and the profession‘s cognitive 
frameworks have not yet become automatic, or when the automatic 
responses seem to create a problem or dilemma for which the tacit 
 
 44. Studies of expert thinking, for instance, show that experts often think in structurally 
different ways than novices. In the case of lawyers, experts and novices follow different mental 
pathways and notice different salient information. See Ian Weinstein, Lawyering in the State of 
Nature: Instinct and Automaticity in Legal Problem Solving, 23 VT. L. REV. 1, 24–38 (1998). 
While the thinking process of the expert is different from the novice, it is equally automatic. 
The expert inhabits a mental framework that is different from that of a novice, and sees what is 
appropriate for the particular framework. Through experience and repetition, the expert has 
learned a different framework. Id. 
 45. JONATHAN HAIDT, THE HAPPINESS HYPOTHESIS: FINDING MODERN TRUTH IN 
ANCIENT WISDOM 4 (2006). 
 46. Without getting into a nature versus nurture debate, I think that most of the ordinary, 
everyday frameworks are also learned, being acquired as we grow up and act in our families 
and social world. 
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professional knowledge has no ready answer. However, for the most 
part, professionals do not experience much of their work as making 
carefully articulated, deliberate choices. Rather, their decisions and 
actions are guided more by their tacit, almost instantaneous sense of 
what they should pay attention to, and what actions are appropriate. 
The claim that tacit cognitive frameworks play a larger role in 
mediation than conscious intentions is somewhat speculative. To the 
extent the frameworks operate automatically, it is difficult for those 
involved in the process or observers to identify when actions arise 
from tacit frameworks and when they arise from conscious intention. 
But the important role of such frameworks is suggested by the recent 
cognitive science demonstrating the substantial limits of our ability to 
be conscious of, and to control, what we think and do.
47
  
A recent empirical study of how mediators describe themselves 
and how they act supports the supposition that mediators‘ actions 
result to a large extent from something other than their conscious 
purposes or self-awareness.
48
 If much of what people do in conflict is 
automatic, rather than consciously controlled, we might expect to see 
a discrepancy between what mediators say they are trying to do and 
what they actually do. When Lorig Charkoudian and her colleagues 
compared how mediators explicitly described their goals and methods 
with what the mediators were actually observed to do, they found that 
the connections were not strong; mediators often seemed to describe 
themselves one way but act another.
49
 Thus, to understand the mental 
structure of a mediation, we need to attend closely to what the 
participants are doing and saying, not just how they explain 
themselves. 
The recent work of linguist George Lakoff provides a more 
elaborate account of how cognitive frameworks might operate in 
mediation. Lakoff combines Gestalt psychology and contemporary 
neuroscience to explain how the mind operates through discrete 
 
 47. For a summary of psychological research along these lines, see HAIDT, supra note 45; 
TIMOTHY D. WILSON, STRANGERS TO OURSELVES: DISCOVERING THE ADAPTIVE 
UNCONSCIOUS 15–16 (2002). 
 48. Lorig Charkoudian et al., Mediation by Any Other Name Would Smell as Sweet—or 
Would It? The Struggle to Define Mediation and Its Various Approaches, 26 CONFLICT RESOL. 
Q. 293, 308–13 (2009). 
 49. Id.  
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images, stories, and metaphors, often jumping from one to another.
50
 
A train of thought can have a kind of path dependence. Each 
metaphor or story opens the brain‘s pathway only to some limited set 
of other metaphors, stories, or judgments. Like the old Gestalt 
images, such as the one that is either a vase or two facial profiles, that 
the mind comprehends in one way or another, but not both at the 
same time,
51
 mental frameworks preclude certain perceptions while 
enabling others.
52
 If this account of mental functioning is correct, we 
can see how the words and metaphors that are appropriate for one 
mediation framework could elicit additional words, ideas, metaphors, 
and actions in that framework, keeping the participants in it. But the 
same words might inhibit awareness of other words, metaphors, 
ideas, and actions that are appropriate for a different framework, 
making it more difficult to shift from one framework to another that 
does not share words or metaphors. The Lakoff model, with its 
emphasis on word-based thinking such as metaphors and narratives, 
is also consistent with the argument in this Article that the way to 
understand and use the frameworks is to pay attention to words. 
B. Other Cognitive Frameworks for Conflict and Mediation 
Researchers and practitioners have developed numerous 
categorical systems for describing and explaining how people deal 
with conflict. In this section, I will describe several that may be most 
familiar to mediators and most relevant to mediation. Each bears 
some similarity to the four categories I describe in this Article. 
1. The Thomas-Kilmann Model 
Based on systematic studies questioning people about their 
responses to various conflict-related situations, Kenneth Thomas 
 
 50. George Lakoff, The Neural Theory of Metaphor (Univ. of Cal., Berkeley, Working 
Paper, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1437794. 
 51. The most famous of these images may be the Rubin‘s Vase, which can be seen as 
either a vase or as two faces in profile. See Jochen Braun, Computational Neuroscience: 
Intimate Attention, 408 NATURE 154, 154 fig.1 (2000), available at http://www.nature.com/ 
nature/journal/v408/n6809/fig_tab/408154a0_Fl.html#figure-title (providing an illustration of 
Rubin‘s Vase).  
 52. Lakoff, supra note 50. 
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finds that people‘s reactions tend to fall into one of five distinctive, 
identifiable styles of dealing with conflict.
53
 They might try to avoid 
(Avoidance); focus on maximizing a result for themselves without 
concern for others (Competitive); readily give in to others‘ 
competitive demands (Accommodative); look for ways to share 
(Compromising); or look for ways to integrate the interests and 
desires of each without unnecessary compromise (Collaborative).
54
 
This scheme apparently derives from the work of Robert Blake and 
Jane Mouton,
55
 who analyzed how people cope with conflict in 
employment situations. Their work treats concern for self and 
concern for others as independent tendencies that could be combined 
in a two-dimensional matrix, allowing for a variety of combinations 
of responses. This way of understanding how people deal with 
conflict has also been developed by others.
56
 
These categories are not co-extensive with the four I am analyzing 
here. The Competitive, Compromising, and Accommodating styles 
are consistent with a Distributive framework—all involve ways of 
gaining more at the expense of another or giving up something to 
another. The Collaborative style is part of the Value-creating 
framework; both seek to cope with conflict by finding ways to better 
satisfy the underlying interests of all the parties. The Relationship 
and Understanding frameworks of mediation do not have obvious 
correlates in the Thomas-Kilmann scheme. 
Nevertheless, both the Thomas-Kilmann styles and the 
frameworks I discuss share a quality of automaticity. People find 
themselves in a style or a cognitive framework without thinking 
about it or planning for it. The Thomas-Kilmann styles and the 
frameworks described here also share a quality of variability. The 
Thomas-Kilmann styles are not fixed in one‘s personality, but can 
 
 53. Kenneth W. Thomas, Making Conflict Management a Strategic Advantage, CPP, 2–3, 
7–8, https://www.cpp.com/Pdfs/conflict_whitepaper.pdf (last visited Nov. 30, 2009). 
 54. Id. at 2–3.  
 55. ROBERT R. BLAKE & JANE S. MOUTON, THE MANAGERIAL GRID: KEY ORIENTATIONS 
FOR ACHIEVING PRODUCTION THROUGH PEOPLE 8–15 (1964). 
 56. See, e.g., Afzalur Rahim & Thomas V. Bonoma, Managing Organizational Conflict: 
A Model for Diagnosis and Intervention, 44 PSYCHOL. REP. 1323, 1325–28 (1979) (using a five 
category model of dominating, obliging, avoiding, compromising, and integrating); SHELL, 
supra note 6, at 9–12 (using a scale similar to Thomas-Kilmann). 
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vary in the same individual over time and in different 
circumstances.
57
 In a similar way, a person in a mediation may often 
find himself or herself shifting from framework to framework—for 
instance, from Understanding to Value-creation, to Distributive, to 
Relationship, back to Distributive, and so on—in different 
mediations, and even in the course of the same mediation. 
2. Charles Tilly‘s Categories of Talk 
The late sociologist Charles Tilly observed that when things go 
wrong, people need to explain why and show how to repair the 
situation.
58
 They do this, he says, by talking in one of four modes: 
using Conventions, telling Stories, invoking Codes, or using 
Technical reasons.
59
 Conventions are often brief, shorthand 
references to how things are or how they are to be done. Stories are 
lengthier, can have a narrative form, and often have a moral message. 
Codes and Technical modes of talk are relatively self-explanatory.
60
 
Tilly‘s categories bear a suggestive correspondence with the four 
mediation frameworks. A Distributive framework often operates as a 
Convention: the parties move through the process of making 
demands and concessions in a familiar and expected pattern. A 
party‘s refusal to participate appropriately in this process may lead a 
mediator to invoke the convention of reciprocal exchange to 
stimulate movement, asking each to make some concessions, as the 
mediator did in the first story described in Part I above. When parties 
or their lawyers invoke legal rights and legal standards in a 
mediation, Tilly‘s Code modality has appeared. The Relationship and 
Understanding frameworks that I describe in this Article are places 
for the category of talk Tilly calls Story. As with Story, disputants 
operating in a Relationship or Understanding framework speak in 
narratives; they describe who they are and what they think has 
happened. For Tilly, and for Relationship and Understanding 
 
 57. SHELL, supra note 6, at 243–46 (asserting that people can shift styles with the 
circumstances, but also noting some stability in a person‘s style, as based on anecdotal 
evidence). 
 58. CHARLES TILLY, WHY?, at ix, 8 (2006). 
 59. Id. at 15–19. 
 60. Id. 
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speakers, these more extended stories are laced with moral 
implications.
61
 
Tilly‘s model shares several additional important features with the 
four mediation frameworks. Importantly, all the modes of talk are 
available to everybody in a situation in which some problem needs to 
be explained. In the course of a single discussion, the parties can shift 
among modes and often do so.
62
 The mediation frameworks operate 
in the same way. While some mediations may exhibit only one 
framework, particularly if the participants are thinking and talking in 
a highly distributive way, the mediator, the parties, and the lawyers 
can swing back and forth between different frameworks throughout 
their time together in a single mediation.
63
 
Second, Tilly‘s modes, and the swings between them, seem to 
happen rather automatically, without the goal-driven, conscious 
decision of the participants to change mode. The shifts have a tacit 
quality that I also find in the mediation frameworks. 
Third, Tilly‘s modes act through words. The parties give life to 
the modes by the words that they say, which is also a key 
characteristic of the mediation frameworks. We can recognize a 
framework by listening to what the parties are saying. Additionally as 
discussed more fully below, lawyers (and mediators) can try to move 
a mediation from one framework to another by the subject matters 
they choose to discuss. 
3. The Brett Categories of Negotiation Talk 
Based on a study of what people actually say when they are 
negotiating, Jeanne Brett and her colleagues assert that participants‘ 
 
 61. ―Stories . . . include strong imputations of responsibility, and thus lend themselves to 
moral evaluations.‖ Id. at 16. 
 62. ―The talk of baseball fans zigzags crazily among conventions, stories, codes, and 
technical accounts . . . .‖ Id. at 22. 
 63. Malcolm Gladwell uses Tilly‘s categories to explain these shifts. Describing in great 
detail a mediation between the victims and the perpetrator of a low level crime, he shows how 
they abruptly move from an accusatory and defensive tone to a cooperative tone of mutual 
understanding and problem-solving, a shift which he persuasively attributes to a shift in the 
Tilly categories of talk that they use. Malcolm Gladwell, Here’s Why, THE NEW YORKER, Apr. 
10, 2006, at 80–82, available at http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2006/04/10/060410crbo_ 
books. 
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talk often falls into one of three different categories: power, rights, 
and interests.
64
 Participants may invoke whatever power they have at 
their disposal in an effort to elicit a concession from their negotiation 
counterparts. Instead of power, they may invoke rights as a source of 
persuasion. Third, they may refer to the parties‘ interests as the 
reason to move towards resolution.
65
 
As with the four mediation categories, these negotiation categories 
live through words. The subject matter of the words (power, rights, or 
interests) tells us which category is in play. A single negotiation in 
Brett‘s scheme may swing back and forth between power, rights, and 
interests as the words and subjects used in the negotiation shift. 
Mediations can exhibit the same variability, as different cognitive 
frameworks come to the fore or recede within the course of a single 
session. As with the mediation categories, the subject matters in 
Brett‘s typology often appear automatically as people draw on the 
category that seems most familiar, most comfortable, or most 
habitual to them. But people are not entirely subject to whatever 
automatic processes elicit particular subject matters. In Brett‘s 
description, they can exercise some conscious control over what they 
talk about, and thus exercise some control over the kind of 
negotiation that will occur.
66
 If the four mediation categories are 
similarly tied to talk about subject matters,
67
 then in the same manner 
mediators and lawyers can exercise some conscious control over the 
mediation frameworks by selecting subject matters to discuss. 
Brett‘s negotiation categories overlap the four mediation 
frameworks that are the subject of this Article but do not completely 
track them. Negotiation that talks about power, or negotiation that 
invokes rights, seems most similar to a Distributive mediation 
framework. Power and rights are deployed to make the negotiation 
counterpart give up something the negotiator wants. Interests talk lies 
 
 64. WILLIAM L. URY, JEANNE M. BRETT & STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG, GETTING DISPUTES 
RESOLVED: DESIGNING SYSTEMS TO CUT THE COSTS OF CONFLICT 3–19 (1988). 
 65. Id. Leigh Thompson provides a vivid description of the categories. If two drivers are 
disputing access to a parking space and one driver flips the other the bird, he is using power. If 
one claims the space is his because he saw it first, he is using a right. LEIGH THOMPSON, THE 
TRUTH ABOUT NEGOTIATIONS 153 (2008). 
 66. See, e.g., URY ET AL., supra note 64, at 18. 
 67. See infra Part III.B. 
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at the heart of Value-creating negotiation, whether in Brett‘s typology 
or in the mediation frameworks; it is by understanding everyone‘s 
interests that the parties can find terms of agreement that increase the 
benefit of one party without correspondingly diminishing the benefit 
to the other party. However, Brett‘s typology does not have any 
categories that seem distinctively tied to either dealing with 
Relationships or creating greater mutual Understanding. 
4. Riskin‘s Grid 
Both practitioners and scholars in the mediation community have 
eagerly embraced Leonard Riskin‘s formulation of approaches to 
mediation.
68
 The Riskin ―grid‖ conceptualizes mediator actions as 
falling on a two-dimensional grid made up of two perpendicular 
scales, one that measures the degree to which the mediator acts in an 
―evaluative‖ or ―facilitative‖ way, and one that measures how 
―broad‖ the subject matters of the mediation are.69 Riskin has 
subsequently reformulated the evaluative-facilitative scale to measure 
the degree of directiveness that the mediator asserts in the mediation. 
The broad-narrow axis remains intact.
70
  
The broad-narrow scale is undifferentiated. It seems continuous—
a mediator can try to broaden or narrow what is discussed 
continuously anywhere along the scale. Moreover, the scale provides 
no explanation of why a mediator would seek to broaden or narrow 
the mediation to include or exclude certain subject matters. The 
degree of breadth seems to depend on the whim or the personal 
predilections of the mediator. 
The four-part cognitive framework scheme for mediation that we 
are considering fills in Riskin‘s scale. It suggests that the subject 
matters appropriate for a mediation are not continuous and 
undifferentiated. Instead, the subject matters are tied to the 
framework within which the mediator is thinking. As we saw in the 
examples at the start of this Article, mediators tried to introduce 
subject matters that were outside of, or broader than, the subject 
 
 68. See Riskin, Decisionmaking in Mediation, supra note 23, at 4–6. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 20–21. 
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matters that the objecting lawyer thought were appropriate. But the 
subject matters were not arbitrarily or randomly broader than what 
the lawyers thought appropriate. They were broader because they 
were appropriate for a different cognitive framework, and they were 
specific for that framework. The idea of cognitive frameworks tells 
us that the broader (or narrower) choice of subject matters along 
Riskin‘s scale depends on the framework. 
III. LAWYERS AND THE MEDIATION FRAMEWORKS 
We now are in a position to see what it would take for lawyers to 
do their work in concert with mediators, rather than in opposition to 
them. To return to the incidents with which we began the discussion, 
we can see how the lawyers could have entered into the framework 
used by the mediator and permitted or encouraged the exchange of 
information that was pertinent to that framework, rather than 
blocking it. The lawyer in the first example could seek to get through 
the exchange of concessions quickly and fairly, perhaps by using the 
mediator to indirectly signal to the adamant other lawyer that she was 
truly ready to make meaningful concessions, but only if they would 
be reciprocated. The lawyer in the second example could work 
assiduously to articulate the underlying needs and interests of both 
parties, and then work creatively to find ways to meet the needs of 
one without sacrificing the needs of the other. In the third example, 
the lawyer could welcome a fuller account of the parties‘ 
relationship, with an eye to understanding how repairing or 
improving the relationship might provide a path to resolution and a 
more satisfying future. Finally, in the fourth incident, the lawyer 
could endorse a face-to-face encounter between the employee and his 
or her immediate supervisor, under the guidance of a mediator 
working in the Understanding framework, to see if a change in the 
antagonists‘ narratives, mutual (mis)understanding, insight, or 
empowerment might release them from their conflict. 
Suggesting that lawyers engage in these alternative frameworks 
creates some important questions. Can lawyers even do these things? 
Is it cognitively possible for lawyers who have been trained in the 
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rigorous forms of legal reasoning,
71
 and who think about their clients‘ 
problems that way every day, to work within these alternative mental 
frameworks as well? This question is particularly challenging 
because the frameworks are not simply points along a continuum, 
allowing a lawyer to slide up or down as one would tune a radio. 
Instead, each is qualitatively different from the other and therefore 
entails a different mindset. Moving from one to another might be 
more like an actor taking on diametrically different roles in separate 
acts of a single play, magnified by the fact that each role has to be 
played extemporaneously, without memorized lines. Some 
remarkable kind of shape-shifting seems to be called for. I will take 
up the question of whether a lawyer can work within these 
frameworks. 
Second, we need to address the question of how lawyers can 
implement these mental frameworks in their work in the mediation 
room. The potential ability to do so will amount to little unless the 
lawyers can take actions that will bring the framework into the room. 
In the last section of the Article I discuss how this can be done, using 
the importance of language for making frameworks. 
The prospect of lawyers acting in frameworks other than the 
familiar distributive/positional one may raise ethical questions as 
well. Do lawyers compromise their ethical obligation to act in their 
clients‘ interests if they shift from a Distributive framework to a 
Value-creating, Relationship, or Understanding one? Conversely, and 
perhaps more controversially, might lawyers actually have an ethical 
obligation to shift their way of thinking in a particular matter, at a 
particular time, to one of the other frameworks? I do not examine 
these issues in this Article,
72
 but will simply note my tentative 
 
 71. The Carnegie Foundation Report on legal education reiterates the common 
understanding that legal analysis, as practiced in first year law school classes, is a specialized 
and narrow kind of logic that turns nascent lawyers away from their pre-law ways of thinking 
and talking. WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE 
PROFESSION OF LAW 77–78 (2007). 
 72. See generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer as Consensus Builder: Ethics for a 
New Practice, 70 TENN. L. REV. 63, 72–73 (2002) (―Lawyers, then, may serve as mediators of 
the social order, helping to achieve the bargained for, principled, and creative arrangements that 
cultivate peaceful co-existence, social harmony, social justice, and Pareto-optimality.‖). While 
Menkel-Meadow‘s article focuses more on the proper ethical stance of a lawyer in roles other 
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conclusions. I do not think that, in general, lawyers‘ ethical 
obligations to their clients require them to remain within the 
Distributive framework. The lawyer‘s primary ethical obligation to 
her client is to serve her client‘s interests. In many disputes, even in 
lawsuits for money damages, a client usually has an interest in 
finding or creating tangible value beyond what a strictly distributive 
agreement could provide. A client may well have an interest in 
clarifying or improving a relationship with the other people in the 
dispute, even if the relationship is not a continuing one but only 
involves how they deal with the process of resolving the dispute. 
Similarly, a client, as an ordinary person, will likely have an interest 
in understanding why the other party to the dispute has been acting in 
such an apparently unreasonable and harmful way, and may even 
have some interest in better understanding how they, themselves, 
figure into the conflict. To be sure, legal remedies usually do not 
explicitly address those issues, but that does not mean the issues are 
not relevant for the client. As long as the process is not hurting a 
client‘s interests, broadly understood, then there should be no ethical 
impediment to a lawyer moving into frameworks different from 
Distributive. Of course, it may often be the case that one framework 
carries risks for another. In the relationship mediation described 
above,
73
 the lawyer feared that some aspect of the relationship might 
lead the client to sacrifice some otherwise obtainable dollars for the 
sake of the relationship, and thus resisted shifting from a Distributive 
framework to a Relationship one. But why should the lawyer 
privilege dollars over relationships?
74
 Doing so may sacrifice the 
client‘s interest in a clearer and better relationship.75  
The relationship between the frameworks is complex. Not only 
may actions appropriate for one framework carry risks for another, 
 
than the traditional representation of one party to a dispute or conflict, its standards and insights 
are equally helpful for the questions facing a lawyer who represents a client in mediation. 
 73. See supra text accompanying note 16. 
 74. If the lawyer‘s fee is being paid as a percentage of the dollar recovery, the lawyer has 
a self-interest in privileging a framework that produces more dollars. However, the lawyer‘s 
ethical obligation is to the client and the client‘s interests. 
 75. For an account of how medical malpractice lawyers can ignore their clients‘ interest in 
a relationship by focusing only on dollars, see RELIS, PERCEPTIONS IN LITIGATION AND 
MEDIATION, supra note 21, at 36. 
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when we are standing on the cognitive island of one framework, it 
may be difficult even to see and appreciate the possibilities and 
benefits offered by another. How do we choose? It seems to me that 
neither the client nor the lawyer should have sole responsibility to 
choose a framework or to move from one to another. The frameworks 
operate as both ends and means; they sometimes serve as ends in 
themselves, such as when they yield clearer relationships or increased 
mutual understanding, and sometimes serve as means enabling 
further ends. Some kind of ongoing cooperation and dialogue 
between lawyer and client is required to dance through framework 
shifts. It is here that the lawyer‘s ethical obligation requires 
something more than simply identifying the client‘s framework and 
operating consistently with it. As a person with experience in the 
process of dispute resolution, and perhaps in the process of conflict 
management as well, the lawyer may understand how a client could 
find some satisfaction through adoption of a framework different than 
the one in which the client is operating. If the lawyer takes some 
responsibility for shifting a framework without the lead of the client, 
she runs the risk of inappropriate paternalism. However, staying only 
within the framework used by the client runs the converse risk of 
abandoning the full breadth of the client‘s interests for the sake of 
limiting the process to those means that are appropriate for the 
framework with which the client is thinking.
76
  
A. Can Lawyers Think Like Mediators in Alternative Frameworks? 
We have many reasons to think that lawyers representing clients 
in an adversarial dispute cannot think or act in ways that will craft 
 
 76. Research on how lawyers actually deal with clients has focused on the ways in which 
lawyers subtly turn clients away from what the clients want and toward what the lawyers think 
is desirable, feasible, or what they believe the clients really want. See, e.g., AUSTIN SARAT & 
WILLIAM L. F. FELSTINER, DIVORCE LAWYERS AND THEIR CLIENTS: POWER AND MEANING IN 
THE LEGAL PROCESS 20–21 (1995); RELIS, PERCEPTIONS IN LITIGATION AND MEDIATION, 
supra note 21, at 129–41. There is less reported on how lawyers accede to their clients‘ 
preferred ends and means, unless the preferred ends and means threaten such a palpable risk to 
others, to the lawyer, or to the rule of law that doing what the client wants becomes ethically 
troublesome to the lawyer. The unexamined extent of lawyer compliance with client wishes 
may arise from the strength of the idea that the lawyer is the client‘s agent; it is only deviations 
from that assumption that become interesting news. 
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new options for mutual gain, improve relationships, or enhance self-
knowledge and knowledge of others. Some of these reasons relate to 
the cognitive and behavioral tools with which lawyers in particular do 
their work. Others relate to the ways many people deal with conflict 
much of the time. 
At the beginning of our modern interest in mediation, Leonard 
Riskin reminded us that lawyers think differently from mediators, and 
the kind of thinking that mediators do remains invisible to most 
lawyers. They just do not see it.
77
 The four mental frameworks I have 
described in this Article help us understand more clearly what it 
might mean that lawyers fail to see mediators‘ kinds of thinking. 
Legal reasoning is all about mutually exclusive categories. The 
doctrines of law articulate categories, enabling us to distinguish facts 
that impinge on legal rights from those that do not. If the defendant‘s 
actions and the plaintiff‘s situation fall within the category of a 
violation of the plaintiff‘s right, the plaintiff is entitled to a court-
ordered remedy. If the actions and situations do not fall within that 
category, the defendant is free to proceed on her way with no more 
interference.  
Because of its binary categorical nature, legal reasoning and legal 
proof bear a strong structural similarity to the distributive concept of 
negotiation. In litigation, if a legal claim is on the plaintiff‘s side of 
the divide, it cannot be owned by the defendant.
78
 In distributive 
negotiation, if part of an asset is negotiated to the claimant‘s side, it 
has been lost by the other claimant. Consequently, in a negotiation or 
mediation, lawyers may have a difficult time understanding how their 
client could give something to the other side without losing an 
equivalent value. Conversely, they will find it difficult to understand 
how the other side could give their client something without creating 
an equivalent loss to the other side.
79
 
Charles Tilly‘s categories of conflict talk, described above,80 
suggest that lawyers are not adept at using categories other than the 
 
 77. Riskin, supra note 7, at 44–49. 
 78. Id. at 44. 
 79. See generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: 
The Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754 (1984). 
 80. See infra Part II.B.2. 
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one with which they are most familiar. According to Tilly, lawyers 
address problems through Codes,
81
 not through Conventions, Stories, 
or Technical talk. They rely on legal reasoning which, as Tilly 
describes it, is qualitatively different from Conventions and Stories.
82
 
(In Tilly‘s analysis, doctors also use their Codes, such as codes about 
differential diagnosis, to handle the problems that face them.
83
)  
We can see a similar clash of types of talk in Jeff Kichaven‘s 
account of a mediation between a bank customer and a bank that had 
unwittingly destroyed the contents of the customer‘s safe deposit box, 
which may have included personal memorabilia such as love letters 
or a lock of hair. The customer‘s husband and co-renter of the box 
had died. The bank had been unable to locate his widow and 
considered his box abandoned.
84
 As mediator, Kichaven suggested 
that the bank acknowledge the pain that the destruction of the box‘s 
contents had caused and apologize to the widow without admitting 
liability. The bank‘s lawyer would not do so. She stonily reiterated 
that the bank had no liability under the law.
85
 Although Kichaven did 
not explain it this way, Tilly‘s categories of talk show us that 
Kichaven was trying to move the conversation from one form to 
another. While the lawyer was speaking in Code, Kichaven tried to 
turn the conversation to Conventions (such as, ―The bank values its 
longtime customers and is distressed when things go wrong for 
them,‖ or, ―Unfortunately, things sometimes slip through the cracks 
in a bureaucratic organization, and we‘re sorry for that‖), or maybe to 
Stories (such as explaining in some detail all the steps the bank took 
to keep this from happening and why its procedures, which are 
usually beneficial, caused an unforeseen loss in this circumstance). 
The lawyer would not move with him. In contrast, in Malcolm 
Gladwell‘s description of a mediation of a petty theft, there was no 
lawyer in the mediation room, and the parties were able to move from 
 
 81. TILLY, supra note 58, at 17, 96–101. 
 82. Id. at 17. 
 83. Id. at 108–14. 
 84. Jeff Kichaven, Apology in Mediation: Sorry to Say, It’s Much Overrated, MEDIATE. 
COM, http://www.mediate.com//articles/kichavenJ2.cfm (last visited Oct. 30, 2010). 
 85. Id.  
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one kind of talk to another.
86
 No one there was invested in explaining 
things through Codes. 
In terms of the cognitive frameworks discussed in this Article, the 
bank‘s lawyer remained entirely within a Distributive framework, 
refusing to see the matter in any light other than a contest of legal 
rights for which a concession seemed unnecessary except to avoid the 
costs and risks of adjudication. Kichaven may have been operating in 
an Understanding framework, trying to help each side understand the 
other better, or a Relationship framework, where an apology readjusts 
power in a relationship that has become contentious and 
dysfunctional. 
I agree that lawyers have a strong tendency to think and talk in the 
binary, either/or terms that are congenial to the Distributive 
framework, and to talk in Codes rather than Conventions or Stories. 
However, these attributes of lawyerly thinking do not bar lawyers 
from entering into the Value-creating, Relationship, or Understanding 
frameworks. First, Tilly notes that when we give explanations, we do 
not limit ourselves to one mode of talk. Several or all of the modes 
can be implemented throughout a single effort to explain, understand, 
and justify.
87
 I will assume that when lawyers are acting in their 
personal roles rather than their professional ones, they use 
Conventions and Stories just as other people do. While their use of 
Conventions and Stories might be affected or reduced by their 
professional affinity for thinking in Codes, it is not eliminated. 
Lawyers may not want to use Conventions and Stories while acting 
as lawyers, but there is nothing about the modes of talk, as Tilly 
describes them, that would prevent them from doing so. 
More importantly, Tilly‘s account of Codes may understate the 
degree to which lawyers actually use Conventions and Stories as part 
of their work as lawyers. When lawyers are assessing the scope and 
effect of a precedent, for instance, they may use Convention-like 
reasons to explain themselves, such as discounting a case because its 
author is a known judicial maverick whose opinions do not carry 
much weight. Similarly, negotiation talk, through which most cases 
are resolved, is filled with conventions about the negotiation process 
 
 86. See Gladwell, supra note 63. 
 87. See TILLY, supra note 58, at 22. 
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itself, even if the underlying legal issues need to be addressed with 
legalistic Code talk. For example, a lawyer may refuse to give a new 
settlement proposal because she does not want to ―negotiate against 
herself.‖  
In addition to such conventions, stories and story-telling often 
play an important part in lawyers‘ formal talk in the courtroom. 
Narratives are stories with beginnings, middles, and ends, with 
accounts of a trouble or disruption, and with moral implications about 
the trouble and the way to handle it. Effective trial lawyers use 
narratives in this form to present cases to juries, judges, and other 
adjudicators.
88
 If anything, lawyers can explain ―why‖—in Tilly‘s 
sense of the term—with greater facility and elaboration by using 
narratives than simply by using codes. Tilly‘s categories help us 
understand the deep and qualitative differences that exist between the 
four cognitive frameworks of mediation, and thus shed light on why 
it may be difficult for lawyers to move beyond the Distributive 
framework. But Tilly‘s categories do not establish that the mental 
arsenal of lawyers prevents them from using the frameworks that are 
needed for Value-creating, Relationship, and Understanding ways of 
mediating. 
More importantly, these frameworks are not something that 
lawyers learned by becoming lawyers. Instead, they are cognitive 
frameworks for dealing with conflict that are available, to a greater or 
lesser degree, to all people. Lawyers knew them before they became 
lawyers, and still have them mentally available. 
The Distributive framework is familiar for all kinds of disputes. 
Someone experiencing a conflict may wish that their opponents 
would give in to them. That response may often be the first and 
 
 88. See, e.g., ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 110–11 
(2000) (―Law lives on narrative . . . . [T]he law is awash in storytelling. . . . [Q]uestions and the 
answers in . . . matters of ‗fact‘ depend largely upon one‘s choice (considered or unconsidered) 
of some overall narrative as best describing what happened or how the world works.‖); see also 
Paul Holland, Sharing Stories: Narrative Lawyering in Bench Trials, 16 CLINICAL L. REV. 195, 
214–15 (2009) (describing how a defense lawyer in a bench trial of an assault claim by a 
mother against her adolescent daughter might have used a different narrative to persuade the 
judge to acquit). The narrative proposed by Holland sounds very much like a relationship 
narrative: the events are to be understood as part of the swirling conflict of adolescence, rather 
than an analytic legal narrative that matches facts to the elements of the governing legal 
standard. 
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strongest reaction to the conflict. The person needs the other‘s action 
to eliminate or at least assuage her own sense of conflict, threat, or 
loss. Most commonly, to obtain this result, the opponent would be 
required to come around to the actor‘s position. The position might 
be a tangible object, an amount of money, or the cessation of an 
action that the first person finds troublesome. This kind of goal is 
sought by distributive, positional bargaining; if you cannot obtain a 
complete concession from the other party, at least you can seek one 
that gives you as much of what you want as possible. It can also 
include nondivisible things, such as bringing the other party around 
to the understanding that you are right or that you deserve the thing in 
question, although total ―victories‖ such as this may be less common 
than compromises. 
Finding options for mutual gain is also familiar from the ordinary 
social world. A key question might be, ―Why can‘t we both get what 
we want?‖ Almost everyone will instantly recognize that if one child 
loves the frosting much more than the cake, and another child loves 
the cake much more than the frosting, rather than try to cut the cake 
into even wedges, the helpful parent would do better to take a larger 
slice of cake, lay it on its side, and cut on the diagonal so that one 
child gets mostly frosting and the other gets mostly cake. Mary 
Parker Follett, one of the founders of our modern understanding of 
conflict management, asked this kind of question when she resolved a 
conflict about whether a library window should be open by opening a 
window in an adjacent room, thus giving the other library patron the 
fresh air he wanted but not subjecting herself to an unwanted draft.
89
 
The apparently competing interests of fresh air and avoiding a draft 
could both be satisfied. Why is this response so obvious when we see 
it? Because it has been elicited from a Value-creating mental 
framework. 
The third kind of reaction focuses on relationship. Finding 
themselves in conflict about some object or action, people might be 
troubled by what the disagreement is doing to their relationship. 
Their goal would be to stabilize or repair the relationship. We 
recognize this often in family situations, including divorces, 
 
 89. MARY PARKER FOLLETT, Constructive Conflict, in PROPHET OF MANAGEMENT: A 
CELEBRATION OF WRITINGS FROM THE 1920S, at 67, 69 (Pauline Graham ed., 1995). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol34/iss1/3
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2010]  Four Ways of Looking at a Lawsuit 51 
 
 
inheritance disputes, family businesses, and the like, as parties seek 
to move past the conflict for the sake of maintaining some form of 
relationship. We might expect to see it less often in workplace 
relationships or between people with a service relationship. We might 
see it even less frequently, if ever, in conflicts between strangers. But 
even between strangers, the parties may develop a relationship with 
regard to the conflict they perceive between themselves, and wish to 
relate to each other about it in a way that does not fan the flames. 
Steven Hartwell‘s account of how we may move towards 
intensified conflict when faced with a social disruption provides an 
example of the relationship dimension. He notes that we might first 
respond to a disruption of social relationship with humor as a way to 
reestablish the relationship bond. If that is insufficient, anger may 
appear, followed by an invocation of rules and then the 
implementation of ritual—such as formal adjudication—to repair the 
breach.
90
 Even if this actual progression does not appear in every 
dispute, or even in a majority of them, it persuasively depicts the 
breach of a proper relationship as an element of conflict. A mediator 
or lawyer working in a Relationship framework might even 
understand that the task of mediation could be to conceptually 
―rewind‖ the dispute to the point where the conflicting parties‘ 
relationship went bad—going back to where humor or some similar 
social interaction failed to do its job—and try to address the problem 
from that point, rather than from the later-developed legal and 
distributive claims. Concern about relationship can be a cognitive 
precursor, as well as a cognitive fellow traveler, of a dispute. 
It is this disturbance of relationships that leads me to place 
apologies in the cognitive category of relationship issues. Apologies 
can involve reconstructing a relationship between people. One person 
acted in a way that caused harm and/or an affront to another. By 
making the apology, the harm-doer seeks to correct the imbalance 
between them that the conduct created. At their fullest, apologies 
recast the balance of power between the parties. By his offending 
action, the offender has exercised unwarranted power over the other. 
By offering an apology, the offender reverses the power relationship. 
 
 90. Steven Hartwell, Humor, Anger, Rules, and Rituals, 13 CLINICAL L. REV. 327 passim 
(2006). 
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The recipient of the offense now has power over the offender: the 
unconstrained power to decide whether to forgive.
91
 This relationship 
quality is most apparent in full apologies, which have been called 
―responsibility-accepting‖ apologies.92 
Finally, people in conflict might find themselves asking what 
could have gotten into the other person. What is wrong with them 
that they should have taken such offensive action? The person 
suffering from another‘s actions might be mystified and frustrated by 
the fact that the other person in the conflict seems so unable to 
understand things from her perspective. She might even be a little 
surprised or disappointed by her own responses to the situation, such 
as a sense of helplessness, anger, or even stubbornness. Her goal in 
this context would be to have the other person understand her better; 
she might even want to better understand the other person, as well. At 
root, she seeks understanding.
93
 
This is not to say that it is easy for lawyers to shift from their 
familiar Distributive framework to one of the other frameworks. For 
example, negotiators have a difficult time implementing a Value-
creating framework, even when the opportunity arises. Researchers 
have found that when negotiators were presented with problems that 
could be solved either by compromises, trade-offs, or contingent 
agreements that actually added value (by capitalizing on the 
contingencies), they tended to miss the contingent, value-adding 
agreements. They generally relied on negotiating for compromises 
unless they had first been given negotiation training using guided 
 
 91. See NICHOLAS TAVUCHIS, MEA CULPA: A SOCIOLOGY OF APOLOGY AND 
RECONCILIATION 35 (1991) (―Once the symbolic overture has been made [by offering an 
apology], the victim alone holds the keys of redemption and reconciliation.‖); Carl D. 
Schneider, What It Means to Be Sorry: The Power of Apology in Mediation, 17 MEDIATION Q. 
265, 271–73 (2000) (providing an example of an apology serving to balance power in a 
mediation). 
 92. Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and Legal Settlement: An Empirical Examination, 
102 MICH. L. REV. 460, 506 (2003) (―Full apologies were seen as mitigating potential damage 
to the relationship . . . .‖). 
 93. For an example of parties using increased mutual understanding to improve 
functioning in a work setting, not limited to situations with a recognizable conflict, see 
generally ROBERT KEGAN & LISA LASKOW LAHEY, HOW THE WAY WE TALK CAN CHANGE 
THE WAY WE WORK: SEVEN LANGUAGES FOR TRANSFORMATION (2001) (explaining a 
systematic method of increasing understanding of both self and others so as to overcome 
interpersonal and intrapersonal obstacles to more satisfactory functioning). 
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analogies that demonstrated how to find more value through 
contingent agreements.
94
 Other negotiation scholars have noted that 
people tend to negotiate in a value-creating way only when they have 
the expectation that strictly distributive bargaining will cost too 
much, or that value-creating negotiation will be more likely than 
distributive bargaining to produce a desirable result.
95
 Lacking that 
expectation in a particular situation, they will tend to use a 
Distributive framework and positional methods instead. 
But people are not doomed to be limited to a particular framework 
because of their personality or their professional training. As 
discussed above,
96
 George Lakoff shows that mental schemas 
excluded from one‘s thoughts by the operation of a different schema 
are not necessarily missing from a person‘s arsenal of mental 
action.
97
 They may flourish if the inhibiting one is no longer active.
98
 
The cognitive frameworks I describe may work like the schemas 
analyzed by Lakoff. They can inhibit each other. A lawyer gripped by 
the Distributive framework may be mentally unable to invoke the 
Understanding framework so long as she continues to see things in a 
distributive way. But even if frameworks inhibit each other, a 
framework dominates only as long as it remains active in the 
lawyer‘s mind. If and when the lawyer stops thinking in those terms, 
other frameworks can become active. 
Thus, we cannot expect that lawyers will easily move away from 
the Distributive framework and bring themselves into collaboration 
with mediators who are operating in one of the other frameworks. 
However, the obstacles to their move do not arise from something 
distinctive about their lawyerly thinking. The obstacles are the same 
 
 94. Dedre Gentner et al., Learning and Transfer: A General Role for Analogical 
Encoding, 95 J. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 393, 401–02 (2003). 
 95. DEAN G. PRUITT & SUNG HEE KIM, SOCIAL CONFLICT: ESCALATION, STALEMATE, 
AND SETTLEMENT 48–50 (3d ed. 2004). Problem solving negotiation is more frequently used 
when it is perceived as more feasible. The perception of feasibility depends on a variety of 
factors, including whether the negotiator has faith in his own problem-solving ability, whether 
the negotiator is thinking in positive-sum terms rather than constant sum terms, and whether the 
other negotiator appears to be ready for problem solving. Id. 
 96. See supra notes 50–52 and accompanying text. 
 97. ―[M]any people have [competing, mutually inhibiting] worldviews active in different 
areas of their lives, and can think of a given situation first from one worldview and then from 
the other. When one is activated, the other is inhibited.‖ Lakoff, supra note 50, at 4. 
 98. Id. at 3. 
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ones that anyone who reacts to conflict in a distributive manner 
would need to confront. 
B. How Can Lawyers Use the Alternative Frameworks? 
The tacit nature of the cognitive frameworks presents a challenge 
for lawyers seeking to take advantage of them. Because they are tacit, 
people implement them automatically, with little or no conscious 
choice or control. People need not even be aware of what they are 
doing. All they need to know is that some ideas—those that are 
consistent with the cognitive framework in which they are 
operating—make sense, and other ideas do not. Like everyone else, 
lawyers may have trouble identifying which framework is operating. 
Moreover, their tacit character makes it difficult for a lawyer, a 
mediator, or anyone else to implement a particular framework. Once 
a framework is in operation, certain things seem appropriate, and 
others do not. Movement between frameworks can similarly occur 
automatically and without conscious thought. It can be more like 
diving into a pool than like deliberately walking, conscious step by 
conscious step, across a bridge. Moreover, mediations are interactive 
processes; what happens cannot depend on the will or action of a 
single participant, but must be shared to a degree. A particular 
framework will only work if a sufficient number of the mediation 
participants have become engaged in it. 
We may find the markers of different frameworks in many 
incidents that occur in a mediation: what the participants say and how 
they say it; how they react to each other; what they feel and how they 
express what they feel; what their goals are; what they fear and what 
they hope for; and so on. To have some way to perceive and manage 
the frameworks, I suggest that we should focus on the first—what the 
participants actually say. The subject matter of their talk can provide 
a vivid indication of the framework in which they operate. In the four 
scenarios with which I began this Article, the disagreement between 
the lawyers and the mediators was, at its most straightforward level, a 
disagreement over what to talk about. Particularly in the last three 
scenarios, the mediator wanted to talk about things that were 
appropriate for the mediator‘s framework but inappropriate for the 
distributive, positional framework of the lawyers. The lawyers and 
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the mediators experienced the reality that some subject matters were 
particularly appropriate and natural-seeming for their frameworks, 
but not for others.  
If subject matter areas form a kind of marker for the frameworks, 
as I think they do, then the task of identifying an operating 
framework can be somewhat simplified. If one pays attention to the 
subject matter of the mediation conversation, he or she can have a 
clue as to the framework that is operating for the people in the room. 
Moreover, the subject matter areas provide a way for a participant, 
including a lawyer, to influence a move into a particular framework. 
If one participant introduces a new subject matter that is a marker for 
a specific framework and the others pick up that subject area and 
continue the discussion in it, the cognitive framework may shift for 
those other participants too. If someone tries to introduce a subject 
matter that is inappropriate for the current cognitive framework, but 
the others resist and keep the discussion going in the preferred 
subject matter, then effort to invoke the alternative framework will 
fail. The subject matters signal the presence of a framework and at 
the same time are part of the creation and maintenance of the 
framework. 
I do not think we yet have a systematic, verifiable understanding 
of how particular subject matters are linked to cognitive frameworks. 
The seven subject matter areas that I describe below might be best 
understood as a working hypothesis of the link between key subject 
matters and cognitive frameworks. I expect they will seem familiar to 
some mediators but quite strange to many lawyers. Attention to 
pertinent subject matters can help lawyers identify the framework 
that the other participants may be using and provide a way for the 
lawyer to try to direct the conversation to a place where the sought-
after framework will blossom. 
I list seven different categories of mediation talk that are 
significant to build or inhabit a framework. None of these subject 
areas belongs exclusively to any one of the frameworks. As will be 
seen, various subject areas can work within several different 
frameworks. Whether a particular subject area is best understood as 
part of a specific framework may depend on its context in the 
discussion, and on the metalanguage—such as tone of voice, facial 
expression, body movement, and emotion—that accompanies it. 
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Talking about a particular subject area may be necessary but not 
sufficient to enable the talkers to mentally inhabit a corresponding 
framework. 
The seven distinctive subject matters are: 
 What happened and what it meant; 
 What can or will happen in the future; 
 Law and legal rights; 
 Fairness and moral rights; 
 Relationship; 
 Feeling; 
 What someone wants, what they can get, and how they 
can get it. 
1. What happened and what it meant. This kind of subject is 
strongly constitutive of a Distributive framework. In the mediation of 
legal disputes in this framework, the parties are concerned about 
historical events. The ―meaning‖ of the events refers to their legal 
relevance. In the context of a litigated or potentially litigated matter, 
the alternative to agreement is the anticipated result of adjudication. 
That is key information for taking the positions and making the 
concessions that lie at the heart of the Distributive framework. The 
participants will use the discussion of what factually happened, and 
the legal meaning of those events, to clarify their own predictions of 
the adjudication and to influence the other participants‘ predictions. 
They will seek to emphasize the facts and legal meaning that make 
their case seem stronger, and will wish to conceal the facts and legal 
meaning that make their case seem weaker. Discussion of what 
happened and what it meant is used in an instrumental way to try to 
shift the point at which the other party will agree to a preferred 
settlement. 
What happened and what it meant can also constitute 
Understanding talk, but in a quite different way than in a Distributive 
framework. For Understanding, it is not necessarily important to 
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reach agreement or change the other‘s mind about what actually 
happened, either explicitly or tacitly.
99
 Rather, in an Understanding 
framework, each side‘s perception of what happened must include an 
understanding of how things seemed to her counterpart, not just how 
things seemed to her. An accurate understanding of perceptions, not 
of a single ―truth,‖ is sufficient. The mutual understanding of 
perceptions becomes the material with which the parties can start to 
build a way to deal with their conflict or resolve their dispute.
100
 The 
meaning of what happened is not limited to legal relevance. The 
important meaning is the meaning that each party gives to the past 
events, for whatever reason, regardless of its objective validity. What 
happened and its meaning are not simply instrumental for persuasion; 
they are intrinsically valuable. 
Talk about what happened and its meaning might also be 
indicative of a Relationship framework, but only if the parties talk 
about what happened in terms of their relationship. For the sake of 
clarity, talk about relationship is better understood as an independent 
category. It should not be crammed into the topic of ―what 
happened.‖101 If the participants are trying to persuade each other of 
the truth of a particular incident in the past and its legal significance, 
we can guess that they are in a Distributive framework. If they are 
talking about how they perceived what happened more generally, and 
about how they understand each other‘s perceptions, we can feel 
more confident that they are in an Understanding framework. 
However, if the talk concerns aspects of the disputants‘ past 
communication and relationship, without an overlay of legal 
significance, proving right and wrong, or trying to understand each 
 
 99. In a Distributive negotiation, a party might be persuaded that the other side‘s account 
of what happened or of the governing law is stronger than previously understood. That change 
would lead to a change in one‘s private assessment of when to settle, as well as a willingness to 
make more concessions in one‘s settlement position, but only if necessary. The party 
negotiating effectively in a Distributive manner would try to conceal any change in his 
judgment about the facts and law, however, so as to keep hidden from his opponent the 
possibility of a greater concession. 
 100. Talk about the past is often part of an Understanding framework. See Carrie J. 
Menkel-Meadow, Remembrance of Things Past? The Relationship of Past to Future in 
Pursuing Justice in Mediation, 5 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 97, 109–10 (2004) (―Without a 
full airing of our past sufferings, we cannot move on.‖). 
 101. See infra p. 60. 
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other‘s perceptions, it would be more appropriate to think of their 
subject matter—and perhaps their framework—as Relationship. 
What happened in the past and its meaning are even less pertinent 
to a Value-creating framework. This framework tries to reveal the 
present and future interests of all parties in order to construct terms of 
agreement that will deliver the greatest satisfaction of those interests. 
As such, the past is of relatively little importance. 
2. What can or will happen in the future. As just noted, when the 
subject matter of mediation discussions focuses on what can or will 
happen in the future, rather than what happened in the past, the 
participants may well be operating in a Value-creating framework. 
This is particularly true if talk about the future occurs in the context 
of the parties‘ interests. 
Talk about the future can also be indicative of a Distributive 
framework if the talk concerns what will happen to the parties in the 
absence of an agreement. In a litigated matter, for instance, each side 
can try to bolster its own commitment to a settlement position or try 
to induce the other party to make concessions by painting a picture of 
what the court will decide. An important distinguishing characteristic 
between Value-creating and Distributive frameworks may be whether 
talk is about what the future would be like with an agreement, or 
about what the future would be like without one. A future with an 
agreement falls more within the province of a Value-creating 
framework: exploring the extra value that might be captured by an 
agreement.
102
 The future without an agreement is more pertinent to a 
Distributive framework: persuading the other side of the negative 
things that will happen to them if they do not agree. 
Talk about what will happen in the future is less characteristic of 
Relationship and Understanding frameworks. If anything, attention to 
the future would tend to come at the end of mediations in those 
frameworks. Once the parties have developed a satisfactory 
understanding of each other, or have identified the latent conflicts 
 
 102. In his advice to negotiators operating in a Value-creating framework, William Ury, 
one of the most effective advocates of a Value-creating framework, tells his readers to ask, 
―What if?‖ WILLIAM URY, GETTING PAST NO: NEGOTIATING YOUR WAY FROM 
CONFRONTATION TO COOPERATION 83 (rev. ed. 1993). The question helps the parties focus on 
creative ways to invent mutually beneficial agreements. ―What if‖ is talk about what can or will 
happen in the future. 
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distorting their relationship, they might be able to develop plans for 
the future.
103
 
3. Law and legal rights. Talk about law and legal rights is most 
pertinent to the Distributive framework for the same reasons as talk 
about past events. It is a way to set the parameters for a distributive 
negotiation. A mediation characterized by such talk is most likely 
operating in a Distributive framework. Similarly, a lawyer who 
insists on this kind of talk is probably operating in such a framework 
and is trying to get the others to operate in it as well. 
4. Fairness and moral rights. In conflict situations, claims of 
unfairness fill one‘s thoughts and often the air as well. While there 
may be a substantial overlap between talk about fairness and talk 
about law, fairness should be considered separately because ordinary, 
common-sense notions of fairness need not be limited to what the law 
requires, and fairness claims may fully express what the parties 
themselves want, even if their lawyers do not initially see beyond 
legal claims and dollar remedies. Fairness claims may also have the 
moral suasion to encourage—or to block—settlement.  
All of the frameworks can include talk of fairness and moral 
rights. Fairness can be used as a sword or a shield in the battle of 
positions in the Distributive framework. Relationship issues are often 
entwined with perceptions about fair treatment; lack of 
communication, dismissive and high-handed treatment, lack of 
respect, and similar relationship issues are often perceived as forms 
of unfairness. Apologies, also part of a Relationship framework, are 
primarily about fairness and moral rights. Someone is only owed an 
apology because the other party violated his moral rights or treated 
him unfairly. Talk of fairness and moral rights is also critical for the 
Understanding framework. Increasing understanding of self and 
other, enhancing empowerment of self and recognition of the other, 
or changing the narrative that explains the conflict and the people 
often entails a shift in one‘s perception of what is fair and what moral 
rights require in a given situation.  
Talk of fairness and moral rights probably appears least in a 
Value-creating framework. This framework sees the problem as 
 
 103. In the Understanding framework, it is essential for the parties to develop their own 
ideas of the future. In all the other frameworks, the mediator or lawyer could do it for them. 
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primarily concerning distribution of tangible goods, rather than 
restoration or reparation for some perceived wrong.
104
 
5. Relationship. Talk about the parties‘ relationship is, as the name 
implies, a distinctive characteristic of a Relationship framework. As 
noted above,
105
 the Relationship framework includes a broad variety 
of relationship issues. Some of these issues look to the past, dealing 
with the ways in which the parties‘ relationship caused or intensified 
the conflict. Others are oriented to the present, examining how the 
parties are treating each other now, including how they behave and 
communicate during the mediation. Still others focus on the future, as 
when the participants discuss how the parties will communicate in the 
future regarding any differences or problems that may arise between 
them. 
Talk about relationships can also occur instrumentally in other 
frameworks. For instance, if the participants in a Value-creating 
framework are developing a deal that will involve a continuing 
relationship, they may pay attention to how they will relate to each 
other in the future, so as to carry out their mutually beneficial 
agreement more effectively. In contrast, in a Relationship framework, 
talk about the parties‘ past, present, or future relationship has a more 
intrinsic value. It is an end in itself, rather than a step to another more 
monetary end. In mediation discussions, one should be able to notice 
whether the parties seem engaged in, and satisfied to continue with, 
talk about the relationship, or whether they explain and justify their 
talk about the relationship by reference to other goals, such as their 
possible deal. 
6. Feeling. Mediation provides a forum for the expression of 
emotions that trials do not.
106
 We should expect talk about the parties‘ 
feelings to play a larger role in mediations conducted in the 
Relationship and Understanding frameworks than in the Distributive 
 
 104. In a Value-creating framework, it is important, perhaps even necessary, that the 
participants see both the outcome and the process as fair. However, it need not be the focus of 
struggle or the subject of extended discussion, as it could be in the other frameworks. 
 105. See supra notes 32–33 and accompanying text. 
 106. What an injured party felt in the past, or is currently feeling, might be relevant in a 
case in which emotional distress is an allowable element of damages. The feelings of a witness 
might also be relevant for assessing the witness‘s credibility. In mediation, however, the 
expression of feelings is not limited to their relevance to the legal decision at hand. 
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or Value-creating ones. Expressing one‘s own feelings, as well as 
perceiving and acknowledging the feelings of the others in the 
conflict, is an important part of most of the Understanding 
approaches to mediation. Similarly, bad feelings often accompany 
hostile or difficult relationships; talking about the feelings becomes 
part of the effort to restructure the relationship. 
When talk is about feelings, we can observe the familiar 
distinction between intrinsic and instrumental purposes. In 
Relationship and Understanding frameworks, descriptions and 
discussions of feelings can be intrinsically part of the subject matter. 
In Distributive and Value-creating frameworks, however, talk about 
feelings can be used instrumentally for ends that are pertinent to 
those frameworks. For example, anger, fear, and defensiveness can 
limit one‘s ability to think clearly about the risks of not making an 
agreement, or curb one‘s willingness to make a concession in a 
settlement position.
107
 Similarly, strong feelings can interfere with 
one‘s willingness to disclose their underlying interests, which are the 
key building blocks for a Value-creating framework. Thus, talk about 
feelings, by itself, will not definitively indicate whether the speaker is 
operating in an Understanding or Relationship framework. Much will 
depend on what came before and what comes after. If there has been 
considerable discussion about settlement positions, for instance, and 
the exchange of concessions has ground to a halt, a discussion of 
feelings might indicate their instrumental use to induce further 
positional movement. If the discussion returns to positions after the 
expression of feelings has ―cleared the air,‖ then feelings have been 
relegated to an instrumental function rather than serving as an 
intrinsic good. But talk about feelings might indicate a turn in 
direction to a different framework. For instance, if talk about feelings 
leads to a more extended discussion about relationship issues 
associated with the feelings, then perhaps the participants have 
entered a Relationship framework. Alternately, if talk about feelings 
leads the parties to spend time voicing a greater understanding of the 
perceptions and motivations of each other, then the discussion of 
 
 107. See Clark Freshman et al., The Lawyer-Negotiator as Mood Scientist: What We Know 
and Don’t Know About How Mood Relates to Successful Negotiation, 2002 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 
21–22. 
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feelings may mark a shift from a Distributive framework to an 
Understanding one. 
7. What someone wants, what they can get, and how they can get 
it. People operating in any of the frameworks should find themselves 
talking about what the parties want, what they can get, and how they 
can get it. What is wanted, what may be obtained, and what one 
should do to obtain the desired result, however, vary in the different 
frameworks. In the Distributive framework, each party wants the 
other side to accede to his or her position; each needs to consider 
what concessions the other side might make, and can then discuss 
negotiation tactics designed to elicit greater concessions. In a Value-
creating framework, the participants will be aware of their underlying 
tangible needs and interests and will seek ways to meet those 
interests through an agreement with the other parties. Parties working 
in a Relationship framework want a more functional relationship or 
some kind of reparation for a failure of the relationship in the past. 
They will need to discuss what should be changed about the parties‘ 
expectations of each other and about their communication with one 
another. Like the Value-creating framework, an Understanding 
framework requires people to understand and express more clearly 
what they want and to understand more fully the perspectives of the 
other parties. However, unlike Value-creating, desires expressed in 
the Understanding framework can include more than tangible wants 
or specific outcomes.  
Table 1 summarizes the relationship between the different subject 
matters of talk and the cognitive frameworks.  
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TABLE 1: A PROPOSED RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COGNITIVE 
FRAMEWORKS AND SUBJECTS OF TALK IN MEDIATION 
 DISTRIBUTIVE 
FRAMEWORK 
VALUE-
CREATING 
FRAMEWORK 
RELATIONSHIP 
FRAMEWORK 
UNDERSTANDING 
FRAMEWORK 
WHAT 
HAPPENED AND 
WHAT IT MEANT 
Higher 
frequency of 
use 
Lower 
frequency of 
use 
Lower to 
moderate 
frequency of use 
Higher frequency 
of use 
WHAT CAN OR 
WILL HAPPEN IN 
THE FUTURE 
Moderate Higher Lower Lower 
LAW & LEGAL 
RIGHTS 
Higher Lower Lower Lower 
FAIRNESS & 
MORAL RIGHTS 
Moderate Lower Higher Higher 
RELATIONSHIP Lower Moderate Higher Higher 
FEELINGS Lower Lower Higher Higher 
WHAT 
SOMEONE 
WANTS, WHAT 
THEY CAN GET, 
AND HOW THEY 
CAN GET IT 
Higher, with 
focus on 
concessions 
Higher, with 
focus on 
future value 
Higher, with 
focus on 
improvement of 
relationship 
Higher, with focus 
on mutual 
understanding 
 
For me, observing categories of talk in the moment is simpler than 
the typical way we approach mediation practice. We usually think of 
learning about and conducting mediation practice as form of 
deductive logic: theory comes first. We identify and embrace our 
general goals for mediation, we articulate our concepts about the 
nature of conflict and its management, and we consider our preferred 
values, and then we intentionally apply particular skill sets that we 
think will allow us to reach our goals. Focusing on the subject of 
what is said in mediation, without such elaborate mental work, is 
altogether less formal and less systematic. The foregoing categories 
of subject matters provide distinctive clues to the various tacit 
frameworks in which mediators and lawyers conduct themselves in 
mediation, but they do not rigorously chart a path to one‘s goal. They 
are more like a doorway to the tacit knowledge embodied in the 
frameworks; they invite entry into a more automatic way of thinking 
and speaking, in which the things that are perceived and said seem 
appropriate and worth pursuing because they fit within a framework. 
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This way of linking the subject matter of mediation talk to 
mediation frameworks differs somewhat from the recent proposal 
made by Leonard Riskin and Nancy Welsh.
108
 To counteract the 
tendency of court-related mediations to focus narrowly on legal 
issues and distributive settlements, Riskin and Welsh suggest that, at 
the beginning of the mediation, mediators should pose a series of 
questions designed to discover whether the parties attach importance 
to other issues besides those directly related to the legal issues, such 
as needs and feelings.
109
 Similarly, they ask the mediator to explicitly 
find out the kinds of resolutions that might be desired beyond a 
simple settlement, such as developing a feeling of peace or instituting 
changes in behavior. The answers help shape the understanding of the 
problem at hand and thereby guide the mediator‘s choice of what to 
address in the mediation.
110
  
Each of these questions is important to avoid limiting a mediation 
to the legal dispute, narrowly understood, and the Distributive 
framework that legal issues so often elicit. But we should not rely 
solely on the content and timing of the questions to identify or 
influence a framework. First, we face the risk that the parties will 
answer in accordance with what they think is appropriate for the 
situation, which will probably appear to them to be largely legalistic 
and distributive, rather than respond as they might in another setting. 
That is, they may answer in accordance with what the context of the 
questions says to them, rather than answer the content of the 
questions themselves. Thinking in terms of a Distributive context, 
they may be less likely to see feelings, relationship, and 
understanding as part of the task at hand. They could honestly answer 
that other interests, relationships, feelings, or mutual understandings 
have nothing to do with the problem. That might be true at that 
 
 108. Leonard L. Riskin & Nancy A. Welsh, Is That All There Is?: “The Problem” in 
Court-Oriented Mediation, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 863 (2008). 
 109. Id. at 905–06. 
 110. Riskin and Welsh use the three dimensions of conflict suggested by Bernard Mayer to 
generate their questions. These three dimensions are behavioral, cognitive, and emotional. Id. at 
881. Mayer argues that sound mediation must attend to all three. See BERNARD S. MAYER, THE 
DYNAMICS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION: A PRACTITIONER‘S GUIDE 41–46 (2000). These aspects 
of conflict refer to characteristics of the parties in conflict, not characterizations of the mediator 
or the lawyers. They thus differ from the idea that everyone in the mediation room is operating 
through a variety of tacit cognitive frameworks, although they do not conflict with that idea.  
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moment, but it would not necessarily mean that the other 
frameworks, and the topics appropriate to them, are not part of the 
problem.  
Furthermore, one could make a mistake by using the statements 
made at the beginning of a mediation to fix the framework that will 
characterize the rest of the process. Frameworks shift. If they do, then 
the very things that the parties thought to be inappropriate when 
asked at the beginning could become very appropriate.  
Nor can we rely on explicit questions and explicit answers to 
determine what subjects of discussion are appropriate and effective. 
Because the frameworks are largely tacit and automatic, they can 
operate without the participants being consciously aware of what 
framework they are in or why certain subjects seem relevant and 
others do not. Explicit questions and suggestions are certainly 
important to identify a framework or suggest a change to a different 
framework where other subjects become relevant. But other ways of 
eliciting alternative frameworks, such as simply raising a different 
subject matter, telling a story that fits within a different framework, 
or lightening the mood to reduce the risks of leaving one framework 
for another, can be equally or even more effective. 
Moreover, the lawyers and the mediator can look to all of the 
participants, themselves included, to establish or shift a framework. 
Shifts in frameworks can be elicited and then maintained by the 
willingness of the participants to continue the discussion along 
subjects that are appropriate for a framework. A striking example of 
influence by continuation appears in one of the simulated mediations 
recorded by Douglas Frenkel and James Stark for their mediation 
text.
111
 In a dispute between a contractor and a homeowner over the 
contractor‘s failure to finish remodeling the kitchen, the mediator in 
one of the recorded sessions gets the mediation to the point where the 
parties have tentatively agreed to resolve the problem by having the 
contractor finish the job, and they are discussing the details of how 
that will happen. On his own initiative, the contractor‘s lawyer 
suggests including a penalty provision in the settlement that would 
require the contractor to reduce the agreed settlement price if he does 
 
 111. DOUGLAS N. FRENKEL & JAMES H. STARK, THE PRACTICE OF MEDIATION: A VIDEO-
INTEGRATED TEXT, at E-28 to -50 (2008). 
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not finish the work in the time promised.
112
 This example 
demonstrates a Value-creating solution: it cost the contractor little, 
since he intended to finish in a timely manner, but it carried extra 
value for the homeowner, who needed to trust that the contractor 
would be good on his word this time. Why did the suggestion 
suddenly come from the lawyer, whom we would expect to be more 
inclined to protect his client from making such positional 
concessions? The other participants had shifted to a Value-creating 
framework, rather than simply trying to resolve the matter by taking 
positions and making concessions about dollar payments. They were 
talking about the future rather than the past, and about practical needs 
rather than rights and the risks of trial. During the mediation before 
this event, the parties had discussed facts relevant to their 
relationship, such as why the homeowner had been unable to contact 
the contractor and what that meant about how the contractor wanted 
to relate to the homeowner.
113
 The lawyer might have tried to derail 
that framework by turning the discussion back to subjects appropriate 
for positional and distributive bargaining, such as legal rights, the 
likely outcome of a trial, or the blame for the initial errors. Instead, 
his way of looking at the problem shifted as well. 
Recognizing and distinguishing the seven subjects of talk as they 
occur in mediation does not require years of training. The 
frameworks are embedded in the thinking of all of us, novice and 
expert alike. The subjects are instances, or embodiments, of 
embedded frameworks, and can appear as a natural, unforced 
phenomenon to anyone willing to observe them. Learning about them 
does not have to precede the perception of them or the act of using 
them. Simple observation can be an effective first step. 
I do not intend to demean expertise. Of course, mediation and 
negotiation are immensely more rich and complex than simply 
choosing between subjects to talk about. Carrying out a mediation 
within any framework, or within none at all, is endlessly challenging. 
The dynamics ebb and flow, information surfaces and submerges, the 
participants sometimes work at cross purposes and sometimes work 
together, all at the edge of, or slightly beyond, the control of any one 
 
 112. Id. at E-49. 
 113. Id. at E-32 to -33. 
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participant. By itself, the process of invoking frameworks and leading 
others to act within them simply by trying to lead the discussion into 
the appropriate subject matter category is rather superficial. However 
easy it may be for a novice to observe and identify the subject matters 
and invoke a particular framework, an expert practitioner will still 
perceive, understand, and perhaps influence the dynamics of the 
mediation with a power and degree of detail well beyond that of a 
less experienced participant. Noticing the framework-relevant subject 
matters of mediation talk, as I am urging lawyers to do, is not a 
substitute for developing expertise in representing parties in 
mediation. It is only one kind of step. However, I think it is a critical 
one, for without it lawyers will find it difficult to open the door to 
frameworks other than the Distributive one. Without waiting for 
some specialized training or ―graduation‖ into expertise, by paying 
attention to the subject matters of talk in mediation, lawyers can bring 
themselves into congruence with mediators, or even influence 
mediators and the other participants to step into the framework that 
the lawyers are seeking to activate. 
Nor is this advice a recipe for lawyers to seize control of 
mediations to the detriment of mediators. Effective implementation 
of a framework requires the collaboration of many, if not all, of the 
participants in the mediation. If only one participant is speaking in 
terms of subjects characteristic of a framework while the other 
participants are not, the mediation as a whole will probably not 
proceed within that framework.  
CONCLUSION 
Mediation presents substantial opportunities and challenges to 
lawyers representing clients. The opportunities include: speeding up 
the kind of positional negotiation that lawyers often use for settling 
their clients‘ cases; finding mutually beneficial settlement terms that 
increase value for one side without imposing a corresponding loss on 
the other; repairing and improving tattered relationships; and 
increasing clients‘ understanding of themselves, their real world 
situation, and the people with whom they find themselves in conflict. 
The challenges arise because lawyers in mediations too often cannot 
or do not act in ways that will facilitate these promising alternative 
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means. When lawyers use familiar forms of positional bargaining 
instead of the alternative cognitive frameworks for mediation, they 
cut their clients off from the benefits that mediation can provide. 
Hindering mediation in this way is not necessary. Lawyers can 
properly do their jobs of representing clients in ways that enhance, 
rather than challenge, the benefits of mediation. To align themselves 
with the work of mediators, however, lawyers need to embrace the 
mental frameworks of mediation that are different from the positional 
negotiation of most legal disputing. Each of the four frameworks I 
describe—Distributive, Value-creating, Relationship, and 
Understanding—provides a different way of understanding the nature 
and content of the parties‘ conflict. Each provides a different set of 
goals and a different repertoire of talk to guide mediation. We might 
question whether lawyers can adopt such frameworks while 
representing clients in mediation. The frameworks seem substantially 
different from the ways in which lawyers think about legal matters. 
Lawyers can adopt the frameworks in a negotiation or mediation, 
even though they would be strikingly out of place in a courtroom or 
other adjudicatory hearing. There is nothing in the legal mind that 
would prevent lawyers from acting in terms of alternative, mediation-
friendly mental frameworks.  
The frameworks are not recipes or algorithmic guides, laying out a 
series of appropriate steps that one can take after adopting a general 
theory. Instead, they tend to operate tacitly, providing those who 
operate within them with a sense of which reactions, statements, and 
other mediation moves make the most sense in a particular context 
and at a particular moment. Words provide a way for practitioners to 
uncover the framework that is actually operating, or the frameworks 
that are competing with each other, at any given moment in a 
mediation. Different frameworks tend to focus on different subject 
matter areas. By paying attention to the subject matter categories that 
the participants are talking about, and not just to the substance of 
what is being said, lawyers can ascertain which frameworks they and 
the other participants seem to be using. Attending to how long and in 
what detail the discussion keeps to one of the seven frameworks can 
give a lawyer a sense of the framework(s) in which the others in the 
room are operating. The subject matters are not only descriptive. By 
trying to move the conversation into one of these subject areas, or by 
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trying to keep it there, a lawyer, like a mediator, can try to direct the 
mediation into a framework, or keep it in a framework, that will most 
benefit her client. 
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